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VOLUME Xil 1977 NUMBER I
The role of presumptions in civil cases has long been subject to
vigorous debate. The traditional view-that presumptions affect deci-
sion only in the absence of evidence tending to show the nonexistence
of the presumed fact, and that they do nothing more than to force pro-
duction of such evidence-is challenged in this article. Especially where
presumptions serve substantive policies, the author believes that the
long-advocated reformist view should prevail, under which presump-
tions play the larger role of affecting the burden of persuasion. The
author recommends adoption of Uniform Rule 301 as preferable to
Federal Rule 301, and examines the forms of jury instructions which
each of the two Rules would require.
INSTRUCTING ITHE I JURY UPON
PRESUMPTIONS IN CIVIL CASES:
COMPARING FEDERAL RULE 301
WITH UNIFORM RULE 301
Christopher B. Mueller*
"[I]t vanished quite slowly, beginning
with the end of the tail, and ending
with the grin, which remained some time
after the rest of it had gone."
-Carroll, Alice in Wonderland
INTRODUCTION
The thought persists that in civil litigation presumptions
should play but a modest and fleeting role. They should
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vanish altogether, we are given to understand, where the
party contesting the presumed fact produces evidence con-
tradicting the fact sufficient to justify a finding of its
nonexistence, and in such cases a jury should never hear
of the presumption. The descriptive images become familiar:
Presumptions "smoke out" the party contesting the pre-
sumed fact, making him produce sufficient evidence to avoid
a directed verdict; when he does produce, the presumption is
"put to flight." Presumptions, therefore, are "bursting bub-
bles"; they are "like bats of the law, flitting in the twilight,
but disappearing in the sunshine of actual facts"; also like
"Maeterlinck's male bee" ("having functioned they dis-
appear").1
There is a second persistent view, however, which holds
that a presumption should be a device which allocates the
burden of persuasion in civil cases. By this view, pre-
sumptions ought to control the decision on the presumed
fact unless the party contesting the fact actually persuades
the trier by a preponderance of the evidence (or by evidence
satisfying whatever other standard may generally apply
in the case) that the fact is untrue. Under this thinking,
the presumption would not be "put to flight" when the op-
ponent introduces sufficient evidence to support a finding
of the nonexistence of the presumed fact: The presumption
would still generate an instruction to the jury-one which
says that the jury should find the presumed fact unless
it believes by a preponderance of the evidence (if that is
the standard applicable in the case) that the presumed fact
is untrue.
The first of the abovementioned philosophies may be
termed the "traditionalist" (or "bursting bubble") theory.
1. See, e.g., Mackowik v. Kansas City, St. J. & C.B.R.R., 196 Mo. 550, 571, 94
S.W. 256, 262 (1906) (Lamm, J., likening presumptions to "bats of the
law"); Bohlen, The Effect of Rebuttable Presumptions of Law Upon the
Burden of Proof, 68 U. PA. L. Ruv. 307, 314 (1920) ("Maeterlinck's male
bee") ; and E. L. Cheeney Co. v. Gates, 346 F.2d 197, 202 (5th Cir. 1965)
(quoting Texas authority to effect the presumptions "smoke out" the op-
position). I have been unable to determine the origin of the "bursting
bubble" simile. It appears as early as 1959 in Cleary, Presuming and
Pleading: An Essay on Juristic Immaturity, 12 STAN. L. REv. 5, 16-17
(1959) [hereinafter cited as Cleary], and in MCCORMICK, EViDENCE § 345
(2d ed. 1972).
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It is most often associated with the great names of Thayer
and Wigmore, and it has behind it the weight of untold
numbers of decisions from all over the country. The second
may be called the "reformist" theory. It too is associated
with great names-Morgan, Maguire, and McCormick, to
list but a few-and it has the support of cases, though not
nearly so many.3
2. THAYER, A PRELIMINARY TREATISE ON EVIDENCE AT THE COMMON LAw 336-
337 (1898) ("If, now, it be asked, What particular effect have rules of pre-
sumption in applying the law of evidence? The answer seems to be that
they have the same effect (and no other), which they have in all the other
regions of legal reasoning. Their effect results necessarily from their char-
acteristic quality,-the quality, namely, which imputes to certain facts or
groups of fact a prima facie significance or operation. In the conduct,
then, of an argument, or of evidence, they throw upon him against whom
they operate the duty of meeting this imputation. Should nothing further
be adduced, they may settle the question in a certain way; and so he who
would not have it settled thus, must show cause. This appears to be the
whole effect of a presumption, and so of a rule of presumption .... [T]he
presumption . .. goes no further than to call for proof of that which it
negatives, i.e., for something which renders it probable. . . . But beyond
that, a presumption seems to say nothing. When . . .we read that the
contrary of any particular presumption must be proved beyond a reasonable
doubt,. . . we have something superadded to the rule of presumption ....
And so, wherever any specific result is attributed to a presumption other
than that of fixing the duty of going forward with proof. This last, and
this alone, appears to be characteristic and essential work of the pre-
sumption"); 9 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2491 (3d ed. 1940) ("[T]he peculiar
effect of a presumption 'of law' (that is, the real presumption) is merely
to invoke a rule of law compelling the jury to reach the conclusion in the
absence of evidence to the contrary from the opponent. If the opponent
does offer evidence to the contrary (sufficient to satisfy the judge's re-
quirement of some evidence), the presumption disappears as a rule of law,
and the case is in the jury's hands free from any rule . . . "). See also
Laughlin, In Support of the Thayer Theory of Presumptions, 52 MICH. L.
REv. 195 (1953) [hereinafter cited as Laughlin]. Most courts at least
purport to follow the traditionalist view. See Annot., 5 A.L.R.3d 19 (1966).
S. See generally Morgan, Some Observations Concerning Presumptions, 44
HARv. L. REV. 906 (1931); Morgan, Instructing the Jury Upon Presump-
tions and Burden of Proof, 47 HARv. L. REV. 59 (1933); Morgan, Presump-
tions, 12 WASH. L. REV. 255 (1937); Morgan, Foreword to MODEL CODE OF
EVIDENCE 52-65 (1942); Morgan, Further Observations on Presumptions,
16 S. CAL. L. REV. 245 (1943); MORGAN, SOME PROBLEMS OF PROOF 74-81
(1956); Morgan & Maguire, Looking Backward and Forward at Evidence,
50 HARy. L. REV. 909 (1937); McCormick, Charges on Presumptions and
Burden of Proof, 5 N.C. L. REV. 291 (1927); MCCORMICK, EVIDENCE § 345
(2d ed. 1972).
See also Gausewitz, Presumptions in a One-Rule World, 5 VAND. L.
REV. 324 (1952) [hereinafter cited as Gausewitz]; Cleary, supra note 1.
And see, e.g., Privette v. Faulkner, 550 P.2d 404, 407 (Nev. 1976)
(Where owner is an occupant of his car at the time of a collision, there is
a presumption that he was driving, and by statute the burden of persuasion
is upon the party opposing the presumed fact); Breeden v. Weinberger,
493 F.2d 1002, 1005-07 (4th Cir. 1974) (Discussion of presumption estab-
lished under Social Security Act; suggestion that the presumption "survives
the offering of contradictory evidence and thereafter may itself consti-
tute substantial evidence . . ."); Pacheco v. United States, 409 F.2d 1234,
1238 (3rd Cir. 1969) (Presumption that driver was agent of defendant
affects burden of persuasion under Virgin Islands law) ; Marks Mfg. Co.
v. New York Central R.R., 448 F.2d 68, 71-72 (6th Cir. 1971) (Under
Michigan version of UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 7-403 (1) (b), where bailor
shows delivery of undamaged goods, and receipt of goods thereafter in
222 LAND AND WATER LAW REVIEW Vol. XII
The occasion for this article is the enactment by Congress
of the Federal Rules of Evidence,4 the adoption of these
rules (with modifications) by six states,' and the endorse-
ment of these rules (again with modifications) by the
National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State
Laws.' It may come to be viewed as a historical accident,
for so far as I can see nobody intended this result, but the
advent of the Federal Rules has had the effect of increasing
support for both the traditionalist and reformist views.
What happened is simply that the Congress enacted, as Fed-
eral Rule 301, a rule which requires federal courts to fol-
low the traditionalist approach with respect to presump-
tions whose effect is determined by federal law. But the
version of Rule 301 adopted in six states espouses the re-
formist philosophy, as does the version of Rule 301 now
endorsed by the National Conference of Commissioners on
Uniform State Laws. (The passage and terms of Federal
Rule 301, and the terms of Uniform Rule 301 and the state
counterparts, are discussed in Part III of this article.)
damaged condition, presumption arises that bailee's negligence caused the
damage, and bailee bears the burden of proof on this issue); Employers
Fire Ins. Co. v. Laney & Duke Storage Warehouse Co., 392 F.2d 138, 140
(5th Cir. 1968) (same, applying Florida law); Alliance Assurance Co. v.
United States, 252 F.2d 529, 534-36 (2d Cir. 1958) (same, referring to New
York law and original Uniform Rules).
4. Act of January 2, 1975, Pub. L. No. 93-595, 88 Stat. 1926. The Federal
Rules of Evidence took effect in the federal courts on July 1, 1975. The
Rules have been twice amended by Act of Congress; see Act of October 16,
1975, Pub. L. No. 94-113, 89 Stat. 576, amending FED. R. EVID. 801(d) (1)
by addition of a new clause (C), and Act of December 12, 1975, Pub. L. No.
94-149, 89 Stat. 805 (correcting minor errors, and amending FED. R. EVD.
410 to conform to new FED. R. CRIM. P. 11).
5. The States are Arkansas, Maine, Nebraska, Nevada, New Mexico, and Wis-
consin. See ARKANSAS UNIFORM RULES OF EVIDENCE, ARK. STAT. ANN. § 28-
1001 (Supp. 1976); MAINE RULES OF EVIDENCE, in Title 14 of ME. REv.
STAT. ANN. (Supp. 1976); NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 27-101 to -1103 (Supp. 1975);
NEV. REV. STAT. §§ 47.020-52.295 (1973); N.M. STAT. ANN. §, 20-4-101 to
-1102 (Supp. 1075); WIS. STAT. ANN. §§ 901.01-911.02 (1975).
6. See HANDBOOK OF THE NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF COMMISSIONERS ON UNI-
FORM STATE LAWS 912-950 (1974). The new UNIFORM RULES OF EVIDENCE,
approved by the National Conference in 1974, are apparently intended as a
replacement for the original UNIFORM RULES OF EVIDENCE previously ap-
proved by the National Conference on August 17-22, 1953. See HANDBOOK
OF THE NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF COMMISSIONERS ON UNIFORM STATE LAWS
161-215 (1953).
The 1974 Uniform Rules are reproduced in a popular edition of the
Federal Rules of Evidence. See FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE FOR UNITED
STATES COURTS AND MAGISTRATES 253-323 (1975).
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Other states, including Wyoming,' are presently con-
sidering whether to adopt the Federal or Uniform Rules,
and it is an open question whether these states, and others
which may in time take up the issue, will elect to promote
state-federal uniformity by following the federal model, or
to promote interstate uniformity by adopting the version en-
dorsed by the National Conference.
This article has two main purposes. One is to urge
support of Uniform Rule 301 as preferable to Federal Rule
301 (see Parts II and IV, infra). The other is to urge
what I call a "broad interpretation" of Federal Rule 301,
both for the federal system and for any state which may
hereafter adopt that version of the rule, as opposed to a
"narrow interpretation" (see Part IV, Subpart A, infra).
These aims are pursued after a brief exploration of the ter-
minology and operation of presumptions, their reasons for
being, and the generally accepted view that one rule should
describe the operation of all presumptions in civil cases, all
of which are taken up in Part I, infra.
The reasons for the superiority of Uniform Rule 301
over Federal Rule 301 are easily stated: On a purely prac-
tical level, traditionalist thinking has never achieved the
aim of a uniform treatment for presumptions, and there
is room to doubt that Federal Rule 301 will fare any better.
As a matter of sound policy, the reformist view is preferable
because it gives effect to the reasons in procedural and
social policy which call presumptions into being in the
first place, while what I call the "pristine version" of tradi-
tionalist thinking does not do so. (And it is precisely this
reason, by the way, which has caused the traditionalist ap-
7. In Wyoming, the Permanent Civil Rules Committee and the Rules of Crimi-
nal Procedure Advisory Committee are considering the 1974 Uniform Rules
and the Federal Rules of Evidence in order to formulate a recommendation
whether either (or an amended version of either) should be adopted for
use in Wyoming. The two Committees have met twice in joint session in
Laramie, under the Chairmanship of Professor Frank J. Trelease.
The author has been advised by Frank F. Jestrab, Esq., Chairman of
the Special Committee on Uniform Rules of Evidence of the National Con-
ference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, that a number of other
states are now considering adoption of Rules of Evidence along the lines
of the Federal Rules and Uniform Rules. They include Montana, North
Dakota, Washington, and Florida. I have also been advised that the ques-
tion is now under consideration in Oklahoma, Minnesota, and Vermont.
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proach to break down into many different rules.) These
matters are discussed in Part II, infra. Finally, and once
again on a purely practical level, the reformist view of
Uniform Rule 301 is entirely simple to understand and to
apply, and there is no reason to fear that nonuniformity
with the Federal Rule would induce mistakes or difficulty
for practitioners handling matters in both federal and state
courts, for the difference between the two versions has little
impact upon the conduct of trial-only on the circumstances
under which a case can go to the jury, and on the instructions
to the jury. (The proper form of instructions under Uniform
Rule 301 is explored in Part IV, Subpart B, infra.)
My reasons for considering in some detail Federal Rule
301 are also easily stated. The Rule is there; it must be
applied in federal court. Unfortunately, it is susceptible
of two-perhaps more-interpretations. If interpreted
broadly, it is only a little bit inferior to Uniform Rule 301;
if interpreted narrowly, it will actually change accepted
practice by reinstating with a vengeance the pristine ver-
sion of the traditionalist thinking which has already been
largely abandoned. (These two interpretations are the sub-
ject of Part IV, Subpart A, infra.)
I. PRELIMINARY CONSIDERATIONS
A. Presumptions and Inferences:
Terminology and Operation
Problems of terminology bedevil the analysis of pre-
sumptions in civil cases. These have been explored exten-
sively elsewhere, and little would be gained by reciting the
long list of terms which are used and misused! Suffice it
to say here that there seems to be a general consensus that
the term "presumption" describes a requirement that when
one particular fact (or set of facts) is established, another
fact (or set of facts) must also be found to be true. By
8. See, e.g., Laughlin, supra note 2, at 195-209; MCCORMICK, EVIDENCE § 342
(2d ed. 1972); 1 LOUiSELL & MUELE, FEDERAL EVIDENCE § 67 (forth-
coming).
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useful convention, the operation of presumptions is described
in terms of "basic facts" and "presumed facts": When the
basic fact is established, then the presumed fact must be
found to exist. As already indicated, consensus ends at the
point of describing the conditions under which the presump-
tion disappears-the situation in which there is no longer a
requirement to find the existence of the presumed fact.
There is also a consensus that the term "inference"
describes the mental process of concluding, from the establish-
ment of one fact (or set of facts), the existence of another
fact (or set of facts): An inference is a permitted, but
not a required, conclusion. To sharpen the distinction be-
tween "presumption" and "inference," the former is some-
times modified by the word "mandatory," the latter by
the word "permissive," but both modifiers are redundant:
"Presumption" includes the thought "mandatory"; "infer-
ence" includes the thought "permissive."
A study of presumptions invariably leads to a considera-
tion of inferences, and it is crucial to bear in mind several
fundamental points about the relationship between the two
terms:
First, inferences may be permitted wholly without re-
gard to presumptions. The question whether the trier of
fact will be allowed an inference arises in conjunction with
circumstantial evidence of all descriptions, and invokes the
concepts of "relevancy" and "sufficiency" of the evidence.
If the matter to be proved is that car owner 0 gave permis-
sion to driver D to operate the car, and that D was acting
within the scope of that permission when he collided with
plaintiff, then the latter might introduce evidence that 0
owned the car and employed D. All would agree that this
evidence is relevant on the questions of permission and scope;
most would further agree that this evidence is also suf-
ficient-that from it, standing by itself, a reasonable juror
could infer the fact of permission and that D was in the scope
thereof on the particular occasion. In other words, plain-
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tiff's proof supports an inference to the desired conclusion,
and the jury would be allowed to draw it.
Second, and this is a corollary to the first point, the
basic fact underlying a presumption may similarly be suf-
ficient to support an inference of the existence of the pre-
sumed fact even after the presumption has been dislodged.
And it seems that even the pristine version of the tradi-
tionalist theory would not hold that the disappearance of
a presumption by itself mandates the destruction of an in-
ference. There are, for instance, two common presumptions
operating in the area of the example described above. The
basic facts of one, which we may call the "long-form" scope-
of-employment presumption, are that 0 owned the car and
employed D; the presumed fact is that D was acting within
the scope of his employment on the occasion in question.'
The basic fact of the other, which we may call the "short-
form" loaned automobile presumption, is simply O's owner-
ship of the car; the presumed facts are that D had permission
to drive and was within the scope of the permission (or
agency) on the occasion in question.10 If, in either case, the
9. Cases applying this long-form scope-of-employment presumption include
Erwin v. United States, 445 F.2d 1035, 1037 (10th Cir. 1971) ; Breeding v.
Massey, 378 F.2d 171, 176 (8th Cir. 1967) (referring to Arkansas case-
law); and Rakowsky v. United States, 201 F. Supp. 74, 75 (N.D. Ill. 1961)
(referring to Illinois easelaw). See also cases cited in McCORMICK, EVIDENCE
§ 343, at 808 n.59 (2d ed. 1972); Annot., 96 A.L.R. 634 (1935); Annot., 5
A.L.R.3d 19, 66-69 (1966). Occasionally a related presumption has as its
basic fact proof of ownership and proof that the driver was a member of the
owner's immediate family. See O'Dea v. Amodeo, 118 Conn. 58, 170 A. 486
(1934).
10. Cases applying the short-form presumption include Tomack v. United
States, 369 F.2d 350, 352 (2d Cir. 1966) (New York statutory presumption,
arising upon proof of ownership, that the driver has the owner's permis-
sion, express or implied); Webb v. Moreno, 363 F.2d 97, 99-100 (8th Cir.
1966) (under Iowa caselaw, proof of car ownership amounts to prima facie
case that the driver of the car was operating with the consent of the owner,
or gives rise to a presumption or inference to that effect); and Smith v.
Savannah Homes, Inc., 389 F. Supp. 384, 386 (W.D. Tenn. 1974) (Tennessee
statutory presumption, arising upon proof of ownership of motor vehicle,
that the vehicle is operated by owner or owner's servant for use and bene-
fit of owner, phrased in terms of prima facie case).
A variant form of this presumption arises upon proof that the owner
is present in the vehicle, and holds that this basic fact gives rise to a pre-
sumption that the owner was in control of the car, see Hansen v. Nicholas
Moving & Storage, Inc., 451 F.2d 319, 322 (10th Cir. 1971) (presumption
invoked in context of imputed negligence, but court finds presumption
"overcome by the evidence"), or that the owner was himself driving, see
Privette v. Faulkner, 550 P.2d 404, 407 (Nev. 1976) (presumption invoked
in attempt to hold estate of owner liable for injuries sustained by one pas-
senger, where no witness could recall whether the owner, plaintiff, or
another passenger was driving at the time).
1977 PRESUMPTIONS IN CIVIL CASES 227
presumption has been dislodged by counterproof, a further
question to be considered is whether the basic fact supports
an inference of the existence of the presumed fact, and at
least in the case of the long-form presumption, the answer
would seem to be that it does."
Third, it would be an oversimplification to conclude
that when a presumption has been dislodged an inference
will be permitted only if the basic fact is considered both
relevant and sufficient evidence of the presumed fact.
Though not acknowledged in such terms in the cases (at
least the ones I have seen), it is apparent that a dislodged
presumption often plays the residual role of giving to the
basic fact an artificial probative strength, in effect protect-
ing an inference from extinction.2 In connection with the
short-form presumption, it is problematic whether proof of
O's ownership would alone be sufficient evidence to support
an inference that D had O's permission to drive the car, and
See also the cases cited in MCCORMICK, EvIDENCE § 343, at 808 n.58
(2d ed. 1972).
Wyoming has a statutory presumption which somewhat resembles the
short-form loaned automobile presumption here considered. WYo. STAT.
§ 31-76 (1957) provides in part: "In any controversy respecting the identity
or ownership or control of a motor vehicle, the registration number borne
by it shall be prima facie evidence that it was owned and operated by the
person to whom the certificate of registration therefor was issued." The
statute is construed in Fox v. Fox, 75 Wyo. 390, 296 P.2d 252, 258 (1956)
where the Wyoming Supreme Court remarked that the circumstantial
evidence in the case supported a jury verdict that the owner of the car
was driving, "at last in the absence of anything being shown to the con-
trary," and that there was "no merit" in the contention that the jury
should not have been instructed to "take [the statute] into consideration
in arriving at their verdict." The statute would appear to have far less
utility than the common short-form loaned automobile presumption, and it
would have far greater utility if the words "or by another with the per-
mission of the owner" were added at the end of the quoted sentence.
11. See Laughlin, supra note 2, at 215. See also Jack Cole Co. v. Hudson, 409
F.2d 188, 192-194 (5th Cir. 1969) (Where defendant's counterproof is not
so "strong and clear" as to refute the presumption, "the issues of owner-
ship and agency should go to the jury." Moreover, "it was within the prov-
ince of the jury to weigh the evidence and to deliver a verdict consistent
with a factual theory acceptable to reasonable men, and in doing so it was
not required to believe the testimony of defendants' witnesses," which was
far from 'invulnerable.'").
12. See, e.g., Gausewitz, supra note 3, at 333 ("If the basic fact of the pre-
sumption is one from which the presumed fact cannot rationally be found
(the basic fact will not support an inference) and the party in whose favor
the presumption operates has no additional evidence, there is nothing left
to support his case when the presumption has been rebutted and a verdict
should be directed or a nonsuit against him. . . . But sometimes [courts]
seem to concede that the presumption has been rebutted, yet hold that the
presumption will take the case to the jury, thus in effect transforming it
into a 'permissive' presumption.").
And see the cases cited in the following footnote.
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was acting within the scope thereof, but the presumption
might support such an inference, even though the presump-
tion itself no longer operated actually to control decision on
the latter point.3
Fourth, the effect of a presumption may of course be
achieved without a presumption. If, for example, plaintiff
proves O's ownership of the car and his employment of D,
and it also appears that D's regular job was to drive the ve-
hicle, and that the collision occurred along the route which
D regularly drove, and at a particular place and time which
13. In New York, the short-form loaned automobile presumption is "very
strong," and can be overcome only by substantial evidence to the contrary;
Blunt v. Zinni, 32 App. Div. 2d 882, 302 N.Y.S.2d 504, 505 (1969); Leotta
v. Plessinger, 8 N.Y. 2d 449. 209 N.Y.S.2d 304 (1960). And even where
such evidence is presented the question of the driver's authority is ordi-
narily for the jury to resolve; Reyes v. Sternberg, 27 App. Div. 2d 828, 278
N.Y.S.2d 167 (1967) ; Ryder v. Cue Car Rental, Inc., 32 App. Div. 2d 143,
302 N.Y.S.2d 17, 21 (1969). It has been suggested that even uncontradicted
testimony by both the driver and the owner to the effect that there was
no permission or that its scope was exceeded will not destroy the presump-
tion (See Mandelbaum v. United States, 251 F.2d 748, 751 (2d Cir. 1958)),
for the trier of fact may disbelieve the testimony of such interested wit-
nesses, and if so the "prima facie proof" of the owner's control "remains
unrebutted." Chaika v. Vandenberg, 252 N.Y. 101, 169 N.E. 103 (1929).
But see Rachon v. Cheuvant, 37 App. Div. 2d 911, 325 N.Y.S.2d 452 (1971)
(Testimony by owner and driver destroys the presumption).
In a famous opinion, Judge Learned Hand focused up nicely the ques-
tion whether the New York presumption could take the case to the jury
when there was counterproof, and he reluctantly concluded that the pre-
sumption could do so, even though Judge Hand believed that the basic
fact "did not support an inference of consent" and was, in the case before
him, "all the evidence on which any such conclusion could be based." Pariso
v. Towse, 45 F.2d 962, 965 (2d Cir. 1930). For Judge Hand, the problem
was all the more intractable, since he believed, and in another famous
opinion so expressed the holding of the court, that the party bearing the
burden of proof could not take his case to the jury when the only evidence
on his side was that of the demeanor of witnesses, all of whom testified
against him on the facts. In other words, while the jury might conclude
that the witnesses were not speaking the truth, rejecting their testimony
would not be a sufficient basis to infer that the converse of the testimony
was the truth. Dyer v. MacDougal, 201 F.2d 265 (2d Cir. 1952). Under
Judge Hand's view, then, the conclusion is inescapable that in some cases
the operation of a presumption, which because of suficient counterproof
against the presumed fact no longer generates a direction to find the exis-
tence of the presumed fact, nevertheless protects an inference, and is alone
the reason why a jury is allowed to draw an inference.
See also Hoerr v. Hanline, 219 Md. 413, 149 A.2d 3,78, 381 (1959) (De-
spite the complete absence of any proof that the driver of a truck was the
agent of the owner, the presumption of agency, arising upon proof that
defendant owned the vehicle in question, sufficed to take the question to the
jury, where defendant's counterproof was inconclusive), and Hiscox v.
Jackson, 127 F.2d 160, 161 (D.C. Cir. 1942) (Presumption of agency and
scope disappears where there is "uncontradicted" evidence of the nonexis-
tence of the presumed fact, but "doubts or contradictions" in the testimony
of the owner and three of his witnesses, and testimony of a disinterested
witness contradicting the owner's evidence, do not make defendant's case
"so strong" as to destroy "all inferences and presumptions supporting
plaintiff.").
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coincide with D's regular schedule, etc., and if there were no
counterproof on these points or on permission and scope,
plaintiff's proof would not only be considered relevant and
sufficient, but cogent and compelling, and the trial judge
might direct the jury to find for plaintiff on the issues of
permission and scope, or to grant a judgment notwith-
standing the verdict if the jury came in against plaintiff be-
cause it did not so find. In other words, the evidence
might be so compelling that no reasonable juror would not
draw the inference of permission and scope. Of course
the lastnamed result is the same one which the long-form
presumption would achieve, and the presumption obviates
many questions which would otherwise arise on a case-by-
case basis: No need to ask whether the basic facts are either
relevant or sufficient evidence of the presumed fact, and
no need to ask whether establishment of the basic fact com-
pels a finding of the presumed fact-at least in the absence
of counterproof, it does.
B. Reasons for Presumptions
Obviously the role of presumptions in civil litigation
should be a function of their purpose, and of their reasons for
existence. Perhaps because there are enormous numbers
of presumptions in more-or-less active service, there is no
comprehensive analysis of their underlying rationales. (An-
other reason could be the sheer tedium which such a study
would portend, both in the doing and in the reading after-
wards.) For the most part, however, thanks to the work of
Bohlen, Morgan, McCormick, and others, we have a good
idea of the reasons underlying the more common presump-
tions, and have a fairly compact general list of underlying
reasons:14
1. The high probative worth of the basic fact as evi-
dence of the presumed fact. Where one particular
fact is time and again shown in evidence as proof
14. Bohlen, The Effect of Rebuttable Presumptions of Law Upon the Burden
of Proof, 68 U. PA. L. REv. 307, 313-321 (1920) [hereinafter cited as Boh-
len]; Morgan, Instructing the Jury Upon Presumptions and Burden of
Proof, 47 HARv. L. Rnv. 69, 77 (1933) ; McCORMIcK, Evmm.NcE § 343 (2d ed.
1972).
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of another fact, common sense and the sheer ac-
cumulation of judicial experience may cry out af-
firmative answers to the questions whether the evi-
dence is relevant, sufficient, cogent and compelling.
A presumption becomes appropriate, and the ques-
tions need not be asked and answered over and again.
2. Substantive policy considerations. It has been ob-
served that the substantive law speaks in conditional
imperatives: "If W, X, Y, and Z are true, then
plaintiff is entitled to relief, etc."' 5 But such state-
ments do not complete the description of the sub-
stantive law, and the description is enhanced in at
least two different ways which are important from
the standpoint of presumptions. 1" First, the burdens
of persuasion are allocated with respect to the various
elements upon which relief is conditioned. The
rights of a plaintiff are in a real sense greater if he
bears such a burden only with respect to W, X, and
Y, and defendant bears the burden with respect to
Z (that is, defendant must prove non-Z), than
they would be if that plaintiff bears the burden in
connection with Z as well as the other elements.
The decision whether an element more properly be-
longs to a claim or to a defense may be made for any
number of reasons, but for immediate purposes the
important point is that the decision can turn upon the
answer to the question whether the policy of the sub-
stantive law is better served by making it easier for
plaintiffs to recover or by making it easier for de-
fendants to resist recovery. 7 Second, as proof of a
15. See Michael & Adler, The Trial of an Isue of Fact: 1, 34 COLUM. L. REV.
1224, 1241 (1934).
16. A third way is to tinker with the standard or measure of persuasion which
is required. For instance, in fraud cases it is well-nigh universal to require
evidence of fraud to be "clear and convincing." See e.g., White v. Ogburn,
528 P.2d 1167, 1169 (Wyo. 1974) ("he who asserts fraud has the burden
of proving the same clearly"); Norton Co. Carborundum Co. 530 F.2d 435,
444 (1st Cir. 1976) ("An allegation of fraud must be proved by clear, un-
equivocal and convincing evidence and not by a mere preponderance of the
evidence which leaves the issue in doubt."). And see generally McCoRMICK,
EVIDENCE § 340 (2d ed. 1972); JAMES, CIVIL PROCEDURE § 7.6 (1965).
17. That allocating the burden of persuasion is a function of substantive law
has of course long been recognized in the context of the Erie doctrine, which
requires federal courts applying state law to alocate the burden of persua-
sion in the manner required by state law; see Cities Service Oil Co. v.
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particular element, circumstantial evidence may be
accorded greater force than its intrinsic probative
strength alone would warrant. For instance, proof
of U and V could be treated as cogent and compelling
evidence of element W, even though reasonable per-
sons might not invariably find W where U and V are
established, simply because the substantive purpose
of requiring proof of W is better served in this man-
ner than it would be if only actual (i.e., direct) evi-
dence of W were given such effect.'"
Obviously, a presumption may be used to fill out
the description of substantive rights, and thus to
implement substantive policy in the first sense noted
above, only if the reformist philosophy be accepted.
A presumption may add to that description in the
second sense regardless whether it is traditionalist
or reformist thinking which holds sway.
3. The greater accessibility of proof to one party. In
the nature of things, proof of a particular fact may
be more readily available to one party than another;
if so, then a presumption may be enlisted to aid the
party for whom the proof is relatively less accessible.
4. The inaccessibility of proof to all parties. Where
in the nature of things proof of a critical fact is
simply hard to come by, a presumption may avoid a
Dunlap, 308 U.S. 208, 212 (1939); Palmer v. Hoffman, 318 U.S. 109, 117
(1943); Dick v. New York Life Ins. Co., 359 U.S. 437, 446 (1959). The
same truth is recognized in connection with litigation under federal statutes,
where the burden of persuasion is allocated by reference to federal law, see
Howard v. United States, 125 F.2d 986, 991 (5th Cir. 1942), even if the
action is brought in state court, Garrett v. Moore-McCormack Co., 317 U.S.
239 (1942).
18. In tort actions, proof that defendant violated a statute is sometimes con-
sidered as circumstantial evidence of negligence, and sometimes as establish-
ing negligence per so; sometimes such proof is treated as cogent and com-
pelling evidence of negligence, and the defendant can avoid being held negli-
gent only by establishing an excuse for his violation of the statute. These
are familiar devices to implement the substantive policies of tort law by
accepting, and giving particular weight to, a kind of circumstantial proof,
which may or may not itself have intrinsic probative worth sufficient to
sustain a finding of "actual" negligence in the traditional common-law
sense. See generally 2 HARPER & JAMES, THE LAW OF TORTS §§ 1"7.5, 17.6
(1956). That the last of the abovedescribed results may be obtained through
the mechanism of a presumption is apparent, as in fact it is in California.
See Satterlee v. Orange Glenn School Dist., 29 Cal. 2d 581, 17'7 P.2d 279
(1947); Alarid v. Vanier, 50 Cal. 2d 617, 327 P.2d 897 (1958). And see
generally PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 36 (4th ed. 1971).
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procedural impasse, serving mainly the interest of
avoiding a deadlock.
A good example of a presumption resting principally
upon the inherent probative worth of the basic fact as proof
of the presumed fact is the presumption, arising upon proof
of the proper posting of a letter, that the same was properly
delivered in the ordinary course of the mails. 9 Whatever
the flaws in the postal service, experience teaches that in
an overwhelming majority of cases when a letter is properly
posted it is properly delivered in due course: Proof of proper
posting is relevant, sufficient, cogent and compelling evidence
of delivery in due course. If the presumption is invoked in
favor of the sender and against the supposed recipient, an-
other supporting reason is that direct evidence on the ques-
tion of delivery is more accessible to the intended recipient
than to the sender, even though the recipient would be saddled
with proving the "negative."
The long-form scope-of-employment presumption rests
in part upon the inherent probative worth of the basic fact,
in part upon the relative accessibility to proof, and in part
upon substantive policy.2 As previously noted, proof of O's
ownership of the car and his employment of driver D would
seem to support an inference that driver D had authority to
19. See, e.g., Rosenthal v. Walker, Ill U.S. 185, 193-94 (1884) (Quoting from
a decision of the Massachusetts Supreme Court to the effect that the pre-
sumption is "founded on the probability that the officers of the government
will do their duty and the usual course of business"); Hagner v. United
States, 285 U.S. 427 (1932); In re Nimz Transp., Inc. 505 F.2d 177, 179
(7th Cir. 1974) ; United States v. Freeman, 420 F. Supp. 1080, 1082 (E.D.
Wis. 1975). And see First Natl Bank v. Ford, 30 Wyo. 110, 216 P. 691,
699 (1923) ("It appears that the letter was received in due course of mail,
and that it is in answer to a prior letter addressed to the defendant and
received by him, and it is held that in such case a presumption arises that
the later letter is the letter of the person whose name is signed thereto.").
20. 9 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2510a (3d ed. 1940) (listing as reasons for the
long-form scope-of-employment presumption "the relative facility of the
proof as between the parties, the ordinary habits of owners of vehicles, and
the wisdom of placing the risk of not obtaining evidence upon the person
who owns a valuable and dangerous apparatus and therefore should take
special precautions against its misuse by irresponsible persons" and noting
that the facts of modern life "demand" that the presumption "be employed
to improve the standard of care obeyed by vehicle-owners"); MCCORMICK,
EVIDENCE § 343 (2d ed. 1972) (stating as the reasons behind both the
long-form and short-form presumption "probability, fairness in the light
of defendant's superior access to the evidence, and the social policy of pro-
moting safety by widening the responsibility in borderline cases of owners
for injuries caused by their vehicles"). And see notes 9 and 10 supra.
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drive and was within the scope thereof on the occasion in
question. Moreover, owner 0 will have better access to the
true facts respecting D's authority than will the plaintiff.
And finally, as a matter of policy it seems wiser, where owner-
ship and employment are proved, to risk error on the side of
recovery for plaintiff than on the side of nonrecovery: That
is, where ownership and employment are proved, it is pre-
ferable to allow some plaintiffs to recover in the few cases
where D lacked or exceeded authority, than to deny recovery
in the greater number of such cases where D had authority
and acted within it, but there was no evidence so indicating
apart from the proof of ownership and employment.
The same three considerations would seem to support
the common presumption, arising upon proof of bailment and
of the return in damaged condition of an article previously
undamaged, that the bailee was negligent."' Here, however,
21. See Commercial Molasses Corp. v. New York Tank Barge Corp., 314 U.S.
104, 111 (1941) ("In answering [the question whether a party has sus-
tained his burden on an issue], the law takes into account the relative op-
portunity of the parties to know the fact in issue and to account for the loss
which it is alleged is due to the breach. Since the bailee in general is in a
better position than the bailor to know the cause of the loss and to show
that it was one not involving the bailee's liability, the law lays on him the
duty to come forward with the information available to him."); Alliance
Assurance Co. v. United States, 252 F.2d 529, 535 (2d Cir. 1958) (referring
to the "strong evidentiary value" of the basic fact, and "strong policy
reasons" existing in the particular case in issue "for requiring an explana-
tion by the party against whom the presumption is applied"). See also
MCCORMICK, EVIDENCE § 343 (2d ed. 1972) (citing as reasons for the bailee
presumption "fairness in the light of the superior access of the bailee to
the evidence of the facts surrounding the "loss" and "probability"); PROS-
SER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 81 (4th ed. 1971) (listing the bailee
presumption among the mechanisms by which courts in effect expand the
doctrine of strict liability) ; Cleary, supra note 1, at 19 (citing "the desira-
bility of holding at least certain kinds of bailees to a fairly strict account-
ability as a matter of policy" as a "more impressive" reason than "proba-
bility" for the presumption).
The Alliance Assurance Co. decision, supra, held that the presumption
shifted the burden of persuasion, but it seems that this is a distinct minority
view associated mainly with several decisions of the Minnesota Supreme
Court. See Rustad v. Great Northern Ry., 122 Minn. 453, 142 N.W. '127
(1913); Nat'l Surety Corp. v. Todd County Dairy Co-op, 269 Minn. 298, 139
N.W.2d 511 (1964). This holding in Alliance seems to have been limited by
a subsequent decision in the Second Circuit, which found that in Alliance
the bailee's position had been "assimilated . . . to that of a common carrier."
Cargill, Inc. v. Commodity Credit Corp., 275 F.2d 745, 752 (2d Cir. 1960).
Moreover, in the Commercial Molasses case, supra, the Supreme Court
clearly held that the presumption "does not cause the burden of proof to
shift."
The UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 7-403(1) provides that "The bailee
must deliver the goods to a person entitled under the document... , unless
and to the extent that the bailee establishes . . . damage to or delay, loss
or destruction of the goods for which the bailee is not liable [, but the bur-
den of establishing negligence in such cases is on the person entitled under
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it would seem that the intrinsic probative worth of the
basic fact as proof of the presumed fact is far more atten-
'uated, for damage may occur for innumerable reasons un-
related to the care exercised by the bailee.
The presumption, arising upon proof of violent death,
that the cause of death was accident rather than suicide,
plainly rests upon intrinsic probability, the unavailability
of other evidence, and social policy.2 The universal human
the document] . . . ." The bracketed language is optional, and would seem
to insure that the burden of persuasion will remain unaffected by the pre-
sumption, and that it will remain in fact upon the bailor or claimant. But
see the Cloverleaf Cold Storage case, infra this note. Some fifteen states,
including Wyoming (WYO. STAT. § 34-7-403 (Supp. 1975)), have enacted
this optional language, although California, Texas, Indiana and Florida
vary the language of the qualifying phrase in a manner which appears
to limit its effect. Thirty-five states have not enacted the bracketed lan-
guage, including all of Wyoming's neighbors. See 2 U.L.A. § 7-403 (Supp.
1976). See also WHITE & SUMMERS, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 20-3, at
675 (1972) ("[Elnactment of the bracketed language is not only a step
backward, but also unsound.").
There are numerous decisions in states without the bracketed language
to the effect that the presumption shifts the burden of persuasion to the
bailee, see Travelers Ins. Co. v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 498 S.W.2d 443 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1973) (not citing the UCC) ; Knowles v. Gilchrist Co. 362 Mass.
642, 289 N.E.2d 879 (1972); Marks Mfg. Co. v. New York Central R.R.,
448 F.2d 68, 71-72 (6th Cir. 1971); Employers Fire Ins. Co. v. Laney &
Duke Storage Warehouse Co., 392 F.2d 138, 140 (5th Cir. 1968). This result
would seem mandated by another provision in the Commercial Code, which
provides that "burden of establishing" is equivalent to burden of persuasion.
See UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 1-201(8). However, there are also some
decisions in states without the bracketed language which keep the burden
on the bailor, see Hipps v. Hennig, 167 Colo. 358, 447 P.2d 700 (1968),
and one case which found such ambiguity in the Comment to section 7-403
that it held that the burden of persuasion was on the bailee even with the
bracketed language, see United States v. Cloverleaf Cold Storage Co., 286
F. Supp. 680 (N.D. Iowa 1968).
And see generally Annot., 44 A.L.R.3d 171 (1972) ; Annot., 43 A.L.R.3d
607 (1972) ; Annot., 21 A.L.R.3d 1339 (1968).
22. See, e.g., Hinds v. John Hancock Mutual Life Ins. Co., 155 Me. 349, 155
A.2d 721, 725 (1959) ("This presumption [against suicide] stems from
and is raised by our common knowledge and experience that most sane
men possess a natural love of life and an instinct for self-preservation
which effectively deter them from suicide or the self-infliction of serious
bodily injury."); United States Nat'l Bank v. Underwriter at Lloyd's, Lon-
don, 239 Ore. 298, 396 P.2d 765, 770 (1964) (citing as the reason for the
presumption against suicide "the generally accepted asumption, judicially
noticed, that there is a human revulsion against suicide," and noting that
where the evidence as to what occurred is uncertain, "it is more probable
than not that death resulted from an accident," and accordingly as a matter
of statistics "it is assumed that of all the violent deaths which occur the
greater number result from accidents rather than suicide"); MCCORMICK,
EVIDENCE § 343 (2d ed. 1972) (citing, as reasons for the presumption
against suicide, "the general probability in case of a death unexplained,
which flows from the human revulsion against suicide, and, probably, a
social policy which inclines in case of doubt toward the fruition rather
than the frustration of plans for family protection through insurance").
That this presumption expresses a policy of the substantive law is
clearly recognized, in the Erie context, by Dick v. New York Life Ins. Co.,
359 U.S. 437 (1959) (requiring federal court in diversity suit, brought
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revulsion from suicide makes reasonable the supposition that
death was not self-inflicted; in the typical case there will be
little or no other proof; and clearly the human suffering im-
posed on the survivors by a judicial finding of suicide and
the financial hardship which such a finding entails if the
suit is against an insurance company for collection of death
benefits both combine to suggest the strongest reason in sub-
stantive policy to find accident as the cause of death where
the true facts may be uncertain.
The presumption of death after seven years' absence
without tidings rests in part upon the inherent probative
worth of the basic fact, in part upon the substantive policy
favoring the settlement of estates and the compensation
of dependents by insurance, and in part upon the absence
of better proof.
for recovery of double indemnity, to apply North Dakota presumption
against suicide, which presumption shifts the burden to the insurer to
establish suicide). But see also the decision of the Court, only a few months
prior to Erie, in New York Life Ins. Co. v. Gamer, 303 U.S. 165 (1938),
declining to require the federal trial judge to follow the Montana rule on
the presumption against suicide, which would have kept the presumption
alive in the case despite the introduction of counterproof. Justice Black in
dissent in Gamer recognized clearly the substantive content of the Montana
presumption, and urged that the federal courts should be bound by the
Montana law. In Dick, the Supreme Court merely referred to Gamer as a
"decision predating Erie." Dick v. New York Life Ins. Co., supra at
443 n.4.
See generally Annot., 103 A.L.R. 185 (1936); Annot., 158 A.L.R. 747
(1945); Annot., 85 A.L.R.2d 722 (1962); Annot., 43 A.L.R.3d 1168 (1972).
23. THAYER, A PRELIMINARY TREATISE ON EVIDENCE AT THE COMMON LAW 319-
24 (1898) (describing in detail the evolution of this presumption from
mere logical inference, supported by reference to statutes, to "an affirma-
tive rule of law requiring that death be assumed under the given circum-
stances") ; MCCORMICK, EVIDENCE § 343 (2d ed. 1972) (citing as reasons for
the presumption "probability and the social policy of enforcing family
security provisions such as life insurance, and of settling estates").
The presumption was roundly criticized by Wigmore as based on "an
ancient rule-of-thumb (seven years) which has no relation to the facts of
human experience in modern conditions" and as imposing "a single rule to
different situations which require different treatment." Wigmore sug-
gested that the presumption operates (1) in connection with claims upon a
life insurance policy, to establish the death of the insured, (2) in proceed-
ings brought by alleged heirs, beneficiaries of wills, or personal representa-
tives, for the distribution of the estate of a person who has disappeared, to
establish the fact of death, (3) in cases involving title to property, to
establish the death of a prior holder or the happening of a condition affect-
ing title, and (4) in cases in which the spouse of the missing person wishes
to establish the validity of a later marriage, to establish the death of the
missing spouse. He further suggested that the presumption should be re-
placed with a Uniform Act which would accord more detailed and flexible
treatment to the fact of absence as evidence of death, without use of pre-
sumption. 9 WIOMORE, EVIDENCE § 2531b (3d ed. 1940).
The Uniform Absence As Evidence of Death and Absentees' Property
Act was proposed in 1939 by the National Conference of Commissioners on
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It has been asserted that nearly all presumptions in-
volve basic facts which have at least some probative worth as
evidence of the presumed fact;4 it has even been asserted
that in most cases the basic fact is sufficient evidence to sup-
port a finding of the presumed fact.2" Even if both asser-
tions are correct, they have but limited significance. In the
first place, it should not be overlooked that some important
presumptions could not withstand rational analysis if in-
trinsic probability were the sole justification. The short-
form loaned automobile presumption, for example, does not
so qualify: If the evidence showed only that 0 owned the car
and that D drove it, and if there were no other proof in the
case having any bearing upon the probability that D had O's
permission and was within its scope, it is doubtful that the
basic fact would support an inference of permission and
scope. Probability alone does not justify the presumption;
it needs the added reasons that one party has better access to
the proof, and that public policy ordinarily favors a finding
of permission and scope."6 In the unfortunate cases in which
there is an issue whether suicide was the cause of death, it
is often true that the known circumstances are insolubly
ambiguous-a gun lying on the floor, a bullet in the head, etc.
-and in such cases it is hard to say that the mere fact of
Uniform State Laws. It is the law in only two states, Tennessee and Wis-
consin, and it was adopted and later repealed in Maryland. See 8 U.L.A.
1-14 (1972, Supp. 1976).
See also Annot., 99 A.L.R.2d 307 (1965); Jalet, Mysterious Disappear-
ance: The Presumption of Death and the Administration of the Estates of
Missing Persons or Absentees, 54 IowA L. Rav. 177 (1968).
24. See UNIFORM RULES OF EVIDENCE 14, comment (1953) (Referring to pre-
sumptions "based wholly or partly on probability," the comment states:
"Nearly all presumptions are of this sort. Among the most common exam-
ples are the presumption against suicide, the presumption of death from
seven years disappearance without tidings, the presumption that a vehicle
driven by a regular employee was being driven in the course of the owner's
business, and the presumption of due delivery to addressee of a letter
properly addressed, stamped, and mailed.").
25. See Laughlin, supra note 2, at 213-14 (A presumption resting upon a basic
fact lacking sufficient value as evidence of the presumed fact to support
a finding of the presumed fact "would rarely, if ever, exist. . . . It is not
contended that all presumptions involve the element of a rational inference.
It is contended that nearly all presumptions involve that element."); In re
Wood's Estate, 374 Mich. 278, 288, 132 N.W.2d 35, 42 (1965) ("Presump-
tions in the law are almost invariably crystallized inferences of fact.").
26. See notes 10 and 13 supra. Contra, Laughlin, supra note 2, at 215 ("It is
far more common for a driver to obtain permission before using a vehicle
of another than it is for the driver to take such a vehicle without
permission.").
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violent death would support a finding of accidental cause
as the more probable if pure logic were the sole determinant.
In the second place, regardless whether logic alone would
justify any particular presumption, in most instances far
more actually underlies presumptions-more in terms of con-
siderations of substantive or procedural policy. No wonder,
then, that courts in fact speak as if the presumption survives
the introduction of counterproof while purporting to follow
traditionalist thinking, for doing so recognizes that there
is more to the presumption than logic, and avoids the question
whether logic alone would suffice.
C. One Rule or Many?
Since there are four underlying reasons for presump-
tions, and since any and each of these reasons may be present
in widely varying strengths and proportions for the various
presumptions, there is good reason to suppose that all pre-
sumptions should not behave alike. There is support for the
proposition that presumptions should be treated on an in-
dividual basis, one behaving one way, another in a different
way, yet another in still a different way. 7 Presumptions
could be a set of tools, rather than a single tool, and there is
at least de facto recognition of exactly such variegated ap-
proaches in connection with some of the more important pre-
sumptions.2
The problem is that such individualized treatment results
in uncertainty: We lack an analysis of presumptions on a
detailed and individual basis, and accordingly we lack a log-
27. O'Dea v. Amodeo, 118 Conn. 58, 170 A. 486 (1934) (seemingly drawing
distinctions among (1) presumptions based merely on convenience, which
obviate the need to present evidence upon facts not really in issue, (2)
presumptions resting upon common experience and inherent probability, (3)
presumptions based upon the fact that the circumstances in issue are pe-
culiarly within one party's knowledge, and (4) policy-based presumptions;
the affects assigned to these vary broadly, but the distinctions are not
clearly drawn). This case is noted further below, text accompanying note
50 infra.
See also Bohlen, supra note 14, at 313 ("[T]he force of each presump-
tion and its effect, as shifting the burden of overcoming the inertia of the
court or only shifting the burden of producing evidence, depends upon the
nature of the need or purpose which has led to the recognition of that
presumption.").
28. See the text accompanying notes 39-66 infra.
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ical hierarchy for presumptions, from which we could deduce
the role which each should play."9 Of course in related areas
we live with such uncertainty: on a case-by-case and item-by-
item basis, we allow the trial judge broad latitude in assessing
the relevancy of evidence and its sufficiency, and whether
the totality of the proof on a point is cogent and compelling,
so as to permit a directed verdict.
But on the matter of presumptions, few jurisdictions
purport to go so far. There are two different bifurcated
approaches in existence, one prevailing in California, another
in Kansas, Utah, the Virgin Islands, and the Canal Zone. Un-
der California law, the pristine version of traditionalist think-
ing prevails with respect to presumptions whose sole purpose
is "to facilitate the determination of the particular action,"
and the intent of this designation is to pick up the presump-
tions which rest principally on "an underlying logical infer-
ence." °30 On the other hand, California follows reformist
thinking with respect to presumptions which "implement
some public policy other than to facilitate the determination
of the particular action," whether or not such presumptions
also rest in part upon probability or underlying logical in-
29. MAGUIRE, EVIDENCE, COMMON SENSE AND COMMON LAW 188 (1947) ("There
are, however, two sobering practical objections to any scheme of variable
rebuttal burdens in connection with presumptions. Such schemes call for
the classification of all the presumptions currently used, and classifying
in any State can never be authoritative until the highest court has spoken.
So long as society keeps up its continuity of change, there will inevitably
be a lag between creation of presumptions and judicial classifying pro-
nouncements about them .... Beyond this, the difficulty of explaining a
rebuttal classification to juries may not be ignored. Imagine a case con-
taining three or four presumptions, all of different classes, and all assailed
by rebuttal evidence.") ; Gausewitz, supra note 3, at 330 (A rule according
separate and individual treatment to presumptions "would be difficult to
administer if not to understand and keep somewhat uniform"); Morgan,
Foreword to MODEL CODE OF EVIDENCE 52 (1942) (noting that the approach
of O'Dea, supra note 27, is "theoretically sound," but that it "has met with
little favor, principally because of the practical difficulties of applying it
at trial").
California, which follows a bifurcated approach to presumptions,
sought to classify some twenty-five presumptions by statute, but it omitted
classification for the loaned automobile and scope-of-employment presump-
tions, and for the presumption against suicide, and it created in effect a
special third category for the res ipsa loquitur doctrine, CAL. EVID. CODE
§ 646 (West Supp. 1976). See also the discussion in the text accompanying
notes 30-32, infra.
30. The first of the two quoted phrases is from the statute, CAL. EvID. CODE
§ 603 (West 1966); the second is from the accompanying Comment of the
California Law Revision Commission, id.
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ferences.3 And California has gone further, codifying a list
of presumptions which belong in each category :32 A striking
feature of California law, however, is its failure to come to
grips with some of the most common presumptions- the
ones relating to loaned automobiles, and the one that accident
rather than suicide is presumed to be the cause of death, both
of which would seem to be clearly in the latter of the two cat-
egories, although not so placed by California statute.
Kansas and Utah follow the bifurcated approach pre-
scribed by the original Uniform Rules of Evidence in 1953,
which proceed upon what seems to be very nearly the con-
verse of the premise adopted in California.3 3 Under the origi-
31. CAL. EvWD. CODE § 605 (West 1966). The accompanying Comment of the
California Law Revision Commission cites the presumption of death from
seven years' absence as one which implements "public policy" within the
meaning of the statute: "[T]he presumption ... exists in part to facilitate
the disposition of actions by supplying a rule of thumb to govern certain
cases in which there is likely to be no direct evidence of the presumed fact.
But the policy in favor of distributing estates, of settling titles, and of per-
mitting life to proceed normally at some time prior to the expiration of the
absentee's normal life expectancy (perhaps 30 or 40 years) that underlies
the presumption indicates that it should be a presumption affecting the
burden of proof." The Comment pointedly observes that frequently a pre-
sumption will rest both upon an underlying logical inference and upon
public policy, and that it is the presence of the latter basis which demands
that the presumption be treated as affecting the burden of persuasion.
32. See CAL. EvD. CODE § 646 (West Supp. 1976), amending §§ 631-45 (West
1966) listing, inter aliaj, the following as presumptions affecting the burden
of producing evidence: That a person possessing an order on himself for
payment of money is presumed to have paid (Q 634) ; that things possessed
are presumed to be owned by the possessor (§ 637); that a letter correctly
addressed and properly mailed is presumed to have been received in the
ordinary course of mail (§ 641); that under certain defined circumstances
a document at least 30 years old is presumed to be authentic (§ 643); and
that under the usual circumstances of res ipsa loquitur the defendant is
presumed negligent and his negligence is presumed to be the cause of the
occurrence in question (§ 646). And see CAL. EviD. CODE § 669 (West Supp.
1976), amending §§ 661-68 (West 1966) listing, inter alia, the following
as presumptions affecting the burden of persuasion: That a child born
during marriage, "or within 300 days after the dissolution thereof," is
presumed to be "a legitimate child of that marriage" (§ 661) ; that a cere-
monial marriage is presumed to be valid (§ 663) ; that an official duty has
been regularly performed (§ 664) ; that a person not heard from in seven
years is presumed to be dead (§ 667) ; and that under certain defined con-
ditions the failure to exercise due care is presumed from the violation of
a statute (§ 668).
33. KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 60-413 to -416 (1964), UTAH RuLEs OF EVIDENCE 13-16,
9 UTAH CODE ANN. (Supp. 1975). The original Uniform Rules were also
enacted for the Virgin Islands and the Canal Zone, see 9A U.L.A. 589
(1965). (I have been unable to determine whether the enactment by Con-
gress of the Federal Rules of Evidence had any effect upon the Evidence
law of either of the latter jurisdictions.) New Jersey too enacted the
original Uniform Rules, see N. J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:84A-1 et seq. (Rules of
Evidence) (1976), but New Jersey's counterparts to Uniform Rules 13 and
14 do not adopt a bifurcated approach to presumptions, and do not on their
face indicate whether the traditionalist or reformist approach prevails in
that state.
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nal Uniform Rules, traditionalist theory prevails where the
basic fact has "no probative value" as proof of the presumed
fact; reformist thinking prevails where the basic fact has
"any probative value" as proof of the presumed fact.3 4
Neither Kansas nor Utah prescribes by rule which pre-
sumptions belong in which category; the Comment which
accompanies the Uniform Rule suggests that "[n]early all
presumptions"3 5 rest at least in part upon probability, and it
has been suggested that in effect the Uniform Rules approach
simply adopts reformist philosophy,36 although there are
cases applying the Rules which suggest otherwise.3 7
34. Original Uniform Rule 14 provides as follows:
Effect of Presumptions. Subject to Rule 16 [which states in
effect that if a special standard of proof, such as "clear and con-
vincing evidence," is required by law in order to overcome a pre-
sumption, such requirement is not changed by the present Rule],
and except for presumptions which are conclusive or irrefutable
under the rules of law from which they arise, (a) if the facts
from which the presumption is derived have any probative value
as evidence of the existence of the presumed fact, the presumption
continues to exist and the burden of establishing the non-existence
of the presumed fact is upon the party against whom the presump-
tion operates, (b) if the facts from which the presumption arises
have no probative value as evidence of the presumed fact, the
presumption does not exist when evidence is introduced which
would support a finding of the non-existence of the presumed fact,
and the fact which would otherwise be presumed shall be deter-
mined from the evidence exactly as if no presumption was or had
ever been involved.
35. See the Comment to original Uniform Rule 14, quoted in part in note 24
supra.
36. Cleary, supra note 1, at 28 ("The classification [of presumptions attempted
by original Uniform Rule 14, supra note 34,1 is a difficult one to apply,
unless it be assumed that the reference to presumptions having nonproba-
tive basic facts is no more than a placebo for the Thayerites and without
real content."). It is interesting to note that Professor Morgan, who car-
ried the torch for the reformist cause for many years, had proposed a rule
identical in substance (although different in language) for adoption by
the American Law Institute in its MODEL CODE OF EVIDENCE in 1941. 18
ALI PROCEEDINGS 199-226 (1940-1941). Morgan's proposal was rejected by
the Institute by a close vote after what has come to be seen as a classic
debate between proponents of the reformist and traditionalist schools of
thought, and the Model Code adopted the traditionalist approach. There is
good reason to suppose that Morgan himself thought that his proposal
would achieve the result of shifting the burden of persuasion in most in-
stances; see Morgan, Some Observations Concerning Presumptions, 44 HARv.
L. REv. 906, 931-32 (1931), and it seems that the major justification in the
original Uniform Rules for excepting from reformist treatment those pre-
sumptions whose basic facts had "no probative value" was a fear that to
do otherwise would offend due process. See MORGAN, BASIC PROBLEMS OF
EVIDENCE 39 (1963). Morgan's reaction to his belated victory with the
adoption of the original Uniform Rules in 1953 was restrained. See Mor-
gan, The Uniform Rules and the Model Code, 31 TuL. L. REiv. 145, 149
(1956) ("On the whole these [original Uniform] Rules [respecting pre-
sumptions in civil cases] seem to me more realistic than those of the Model
Code. Simplicity in application is the fundamental argument in favor of
the Thayer doctrine. Whether the Uniform Rule presents appreciably
greater difficulty in application can be proved only by experience.").
37. Of the six decisions which I have found from Kansas and Utah considering
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It seems clear that, with respect to presumptions in
civil cases, most American jurisdictions at least purport
to follow what Professor Gausewitz has called the policy
of "procedural justice," rather than a policy of "particular
justice."38 That is, most jurisdictions prefer to treat all pre-
sumptions alike, or to follow not more than two simple rules,
rather than analyzing presumptions as highly individualized
creations of the law, behaving in different ways in different
cases, with all the attendant uncertainties.
the meaning of the original Uniform Rule 14, supra note 34, only one con-
cludes that the presumption in question affects the burden of persuasion
under Rule 14(a) because its basic fact has probative worth on the pre-
sumed fact. Four find the presumption in question to be covered by Rule
14(b), therefore meriting traditionalist treatment, because the basic fact
lacks probative worth on the issue of the presumed fact. The other avoids
the question.
See Koesling v. Basamakis, 539 P.2d 1043, 1045 n.4 (Utah 1975)
("Had the presumption [of partnership, arising from distribution of profits
from a business] arisen, its effect would have been to shift the burden of
producing evidence of the nonexistence of the presumed fact to the defen-
dant since the facts from which the presumption is derived have probative
value as evidence of the presumed fact. Rule 14, Utah Rules of Evi-
dence." [This construction of the Rule fairly boggles the mind.]) ; Hagood
v. Hall, 211 Kan. 46, 505 P.2d 736, 740 (1973) (presumption of "due care"
on part of decedent is governed by Kansas' counterpart to Rule 14 (b) [and
therefore apparently receives traditionalist treatment]) ; State v. Duke,
205 Kan. 37, 468 P.2d 132, 135 (presumption in favor of validity of foreign
judgment, and of truth of recitals in journal entry attached thereto, is gov-
erned by the Kansas counterpart to Rule 14(a) [and therefore apparently
receives reformist treatment]); Akin v. Estate of Hill, 201 Kan. 306, 440
P.2d 585, 589 (1968) (presumption of "due care" on part of decedent is
governed by the Kansas counterpart to Rule 14(b) [and therefore appar-
ently receives traditionalist treatment]); Londerholm v. Unified School
Dist. No. 500, 199 Kan. 312, 430 P.2d 188, 196 (1967) (implying that pre-
sumption of segregation by race, arising upon proof that almost all white
employees are assigned to one group of schools, and almost all black em-
ployees to another, is a presumption governed by the Kansas counterpart
to Uniform Rule 14(b) [therefore meriting traditionalist treatment]), and
Prior v. Best Cabs, Inc., 199 Kan. 77, 427 P.2d 481, 483 (1967) (not decid-
ing whether presumption of negligence, arising upon proof that a driver
entered into intersection in the face of oncoming traffic which he did not
see, should be classified as arising under the Kansas counterpart to Rule
14(a) or 14(b)).
38. Gausewitz, supra note 3, at 331 ("It is believed that the problems that
arise in the use of the presumption device are not 'problems' because of
difficulty in understanding and describing the rules, principles or facts
involved in a particular case. They are problems because there is a conflict
between two fundamntal principles or policies . . . . The one policy is to
do actual, concrete, substantial justice in each individual case; the other
policy is to do formal, procedural justice by having a uniform rule that
is easily administered regardless of its effect in the particular case ...
The first of thse conflicting policies can be called the 'particular justice
policy' because it aims at actual justice in the particular, individual, case.
The other can be called the 'procedural justice policy' because it aims at
an easily understood and administered uniform rule that will probably
result in justice in the average case or in most cases regardless of its
effect in the individual case and also avoid injustices due to difficulties of
administration. Almost everyone seems to agree, and always to have agreed,
that the procedural justice policy should be followed in dealing with pre-
sumptions; that there should be one rule for all, or all but one or two or a
very few presumptions.").
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II. TRADITIONALIST AND REFORMIST THINKING COMPARED
A. The Traditionalist Approach:
Out of One Rule, Many
Traditionalist thinking has failed to produce a single ap-
proach to presumptions. At least five different approaches
may be discerned in the cases. First is the one implied by
the traditionalist theory in its pristine form, which holds
that the presumption disappears upon the introduction of
counterproof sufficient to support a finding of the non-
existence of the presumed fact. Second is one which says
that the presumption stays in the case until the opponent of
the presumed fact introduces "substantial," "uncontradicted"
or perhaps "disinterested" testimony of the nonexistence of
the fact. In other words, the presumption imposes upon the
opponent the burden of introducing counterproof of this
calibre. Third is one which says that the presumption im-
poses upon the opponent of the presumed fact the burden of
producing evidence of the nonexistence of the fact which is
(i) sufficient to support a finding of the nonexistence of the
fact, and (ii) actually believed by the jury. Fourth is one
which says that the presumption imposes upon the opponent
of the presumed fact the burden of producing enough evidence
of the nonexistence of the fact to put the mind of the trier of
fact at "equipoise" or "equilibrium," and that until the count-
erproof persuades the jury that the nonexistence of the fact
is at least equally as probable as its existence, the presumption
controls. Fifth is one which says that the presumption is
"evidence" to be considered with all the other evidence in the
case, and that the jury should be told to decide whether the
presumed fact exists simply by weighing all the evidence in
the case, including the presumption.
1. Traditionalist Theory in its Pristine Form.
Taking the bursting bubble theory at face value, a judge
or lawyer can have little difficulty in understanding its opera-
tion. If the basic fact is established as a matter of law, or
found true by the trier of fact, and if there is no evidence
or insufficient evidence to support a finding of the non-
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existence of the presumed fact, the presumption controls
decision; otherwise, the presumption is out of the case al-
together." Of course an inference may remain, if without
regard to the presumption it happens that the basic fact is
not only relevant evidence of the presumed fact, but sufficient
as well; if so, proof of the basic fact may insure that the
case will still go to the jury. The forms of instructions
which this "pristine form" of the traditionalist theory re-
quires are explored further below, under the heading "Rule
301 Narrowly Construed."
The pristine version of the traditionalist theory runs
into deep trouble in cases in which (i) only a presumption
can carry the issue to the jury, (ii) the opponent of the pre-
sumed fact introduces sufficient evidence of its nonexistence
to support a finding thereof, thus dislodging the presumption,
but (iii) this counterproof is disbelieved. A classic case,
made especially poignant by the fact that events actually in-
dicated that the jury disbelieved the counterproof, and for
that reason vigorously attacked by Morgan, arose in Rhode
39. Nobody seems to argue that a presumption could be dislodged by counter-
proof which is insufficient to support a finding of the nonexistence of the
presumed fact. See MORGAN, BASIC PROBLEMS OF EVIDENCE 34 (1962);
Morgan, Instructing the Jury Upon Presumptions and Burdens of Proof, 47
HARv. L. REV. 59, 69 (1933) ; Cleary, supra note 1, at 18. In its statutory
description of the effect of those presumptions which receive traditionalist
treatment, California makes the point expressly: Such presumptions "re-
quire the trier of fact to assume the existence of the presumed fact unless
and until evidence is introduced which would support a finding of its non-
existence." CAL. EVID. CODE § 604 (West 1966). Just as it is sometimes
(inadvisedly) said that it takes "substantial" evidence to create a jury
question, and that a "mere scintilla" of evidence will not suffice, see 9
WRIGHT & MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE, Civil, § 2524 (1971),
so it is sometimes said in the context of presumptions treated by the tra-
ditionalist approach in its pristine form that it takes "substantial evidence
to the contrary" to make the presumption disappear. See O'Brien v. Equit-
able Life Assurance Soc'y, 212 F.2d 383, 386 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 348
U.S. 835 (1954) (the holding makes it entirely clear that the court would
require exactly the same quality of proof to create a jury question as it
would require to make a presumption disappear). In both contexts, the
real question is whether the proof is of such quality that it would enable a
reasonable and impartial person to reach a conclusion favorable to the
proponent; if "substantial" is intended only to be a description for proof of
this quality, and perhaps also to mean "more than a mere scintilla," then
the word does little harm and little good. See Boeing Co. v. Shipman, 411
F.2d 365, 374 (5th Cir. 1969); 9 WRIGHT & MILER, supra. It should be
noted, however, that usually when decisions talk of a requirement for "sub-
stantial evidence" in order to dislodge a presumption, the mean more than
the kind of proof which is usually necessary to create a question for the
jury to decide-a point which is brought home by the use of other adjec-
tives, such as "uncontradicted," and which is considered further in the text
accompanying notes 43-47 inf!ra.
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Island.4" It involved the long-form scope of employment pre-
sumption, arising from proof of defendant's ownership of an
automobile and his employment of the driver, that the driver
was acting within the scope of his employment at the time
of the accident in litigation. Plaintiff presented proof of the
employment of the driver, but no evidence on the question
whether the driver was acting within the scope of his em-
ployment on the occasion in question. Defendant testified
that the driver was not within the scope of his employment at
the time. Defendant's motion for a directed verdict was
denied; the case went to the jury, which found for the plain-
tiff. Defendant's motion for a new trial was then denied
too, but the Rhode Island Supreme Court thought defendant
was entitled to a new trial:
The trial justice as well as the jury believed
the defendant was not telling the truth when he
testified that Riley, at the time of the accident, was
not acting within the scope of his employment. How-
ever, the defendant did so testify, and the plaintiff
produced no evidence to the contrary. The burden
was upon the plaintiff to establish agency. He
proved that the automobile was being driven by de-
fendant's employee. This raised a prima facie pre-
sumption that the driver was engaged upon the de-
fendant's business .... This presumption, however,
is operative only in the absence of any credible evi-
dence to the contrary for the defendant.... In such
a case a presumption is not evidence. It is entitled
to no weight as evidence. The presumption excuses
the plaintiff from offering evidence on the ques-
tion until defendant produces evidence of the non-
existence of the facts which, until evidence to the
contrary is produced, are presumed to exist ...
The plaintiff offered nothing to prove agency. The
defendant's failure to produce the driver of his auto-
mobile cannot be treated as direct evidence tending
to prove agency.... [A]s the plaintiff had nothing
but a presumption to rely upon to establish agency,
and as agency was denied, we think it was error to
deny the defendant's motion for a new trial. 1
40. McIver v. Schwartz, 50 R.I. 68, 145 A. 101 (1929). See Morgan, Some Ob-
servations Concerning Presumptions, 44 HARV. L. REv. 906, 912-13 (1931),
and ALI PROCEEDINGS 199-226 (1940-1941).
41. McIver v. Schwartz, supra note 40, at 102.
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The result and reasoning of the Rhode Island case are
badly flawed. It is impossible to say why a presumption is
strong enough to require a finding of the presumed fact
where no counterproof has been adduced, and yet so weak
that it cannot even carry the issue to the jury when the op-
ponent of the presumed fact adduces testimony which nobody
believes. If the presumption in question embodies a substan-
tive policy, under which a court should rather err on the
side of recovery than on the side of nonliability when owner-
ship and employment are proved and the other critical facts
are in doubt, then such a policy is disserved if it can be over-
come by proof which nobody credits. If the presumption in
question embodies a special procedural policy-one which
says that the defendant should come forward with proof,
since he has the better access to the underlying facts-then
the policy seems hardly worth having if the opponent can
overcome the presumption with unbelieved proof.
Too much can be made of the Rhode Island case, however,
if it is put forward in favor of a policy which would give pre-
sumptions greater effect than the pristine version of the
traditionalist theory would allow. While the result in the
case could be corrected by increasing the effect of the pre-
sumption, probably the Rhode Island court simply erred in
ignoring the possibility that the basic fact would support an
inference of the existence of the presumed fact: It seems that
most would agree that the basic fact in that case would sup-
port such an inference. However, as previously noted, there
are presumptions which cannot be justified solely upon the
strength of the underlying inference, and there are other ex-
amples of cases which could get to the jury only if the pre-
sumption were given a continuing role after counterproof had
been introduced sufficient to support a finding of the non-
existence of the presumed fact.42
42. See O'Brien v. Equitable Life Assurance Soc'y of United States, 212 F.2d
383 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 835 (1954) (In suit for double in-
demnity on a life insurance policy, the trial court directed a verdict for
the defendant insurance carrier. The issue was whether the insured, who
had been killed by gunshot, had at the time been committing a felony or
assault. If so, then plaintiff could recover only the face amount of the
policy; if the insured had met his death by "accident," then plaintif could
recover double indemnity. Plaintiff bore the burden of proving accident.
The Court of Appeals acceded to the view that when a violent death is
1977
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Quite apart from the question whether the only cure
for such cases is to give greater effect to presumptions, the
fact is that courts have chosen to cure the problem by this
method. It may well be that the chosen method is a way of
avoiding the question whether the underlying fact would,
standing alone, support an inference; however, it is also a
way of recognizing the force of the substantive policy under-
lying the presumption.
2. The "Substantial" or "Uncontradicted" Evidence
Approach.4
The virtue of this approach is that it preserves for the
jury the question whether the presumed fact exists, even
where the opponent of the fact introduces sufficient evidence
to support a finding of its nonexistence. The approach works
this way: As is true of the pristine version of the traditional-
ist theory, the presumption controls decision on the pre-
sumed fact until the opponent introduces evidence sufficient
to support a finding that the fact does not exist. Where the
opponent does adduce proof which is sufficient, but not "sub-
shown, there is a "prima facie case" of accidental death, which arises from
"a presumption against nonaccidental death." It appeared that the insured
was shot while visiting a woman at her house, and that the person who
shot the insured was the woman's husband: The husband testified that he
heard an "outcry" from the house, had gotten a gun, had found the insured
in bed with his wife, and opened fire; the woman testified that the insured
had "forced" her into the bedroom and "onto the bed." The Court of Ap-
peals found this to be "positive, substantial testimony," which destroyed
the presumption of accidental death altogether. Accordingly, plaintiff had
to come forward with "substantial evidence," and plaintiff's proof that the
insured had some $200 on his person on the fatal day, and a pair of glasses,
and that these were missing after the shooting, was not sufficient to prove
that the insured who was the victim of a crime. The judgment of the trial
court was affirmed.).
43. The adjectives used to describe the "substantial" or "uncontradicted" evi-
dence standard vary from case to case and perhaps the standard itself
varies. However, it appears that the decisions all have in mind approxi-
mately the same standard, and what is meant by "substantial" or "uncon-
tradicted" evidence is something more than what would be required simply
to take a case to a jury. See note 39 supra. All of the following cases in-
volve either the short-form loaned automobile presumption, or the long-
form scope-of-employment presumption, or some variant thereof. See notes
9 and 10 supra.
The following cases employ the term "substantial evidence": Tomack
v. United States, 369 F.2d 350, 352 (2d Cir. 1966); Jones v. Halun, 296
F.2d 597, 598 (D.C. Cir. 1961); Royal Indemnity Co. v. Wingate, 353 F.
Supp. 1002, 1004 (D. Md. 193).
The following cases speak of "undisputed" evidence to the contrary:
Miller v. United States, 67 F.R.D. 486, 488 (D.D.C. 1975) ("uncontra-
dicted"); Hardy v. United States, 304 F. Supp. 855, 856 (N.D. Ga. 1969) ;
Guthrie v. United States, 260 F. Supp. 289, 291 (E.D. Wis. 1966), a/I'd
392 F.2d 858 (7th Cir. 1968).
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stantial" or "uncontradicted," the presumption is reduced to
an inference. Unlike the pristine form of the traditionalist
approach, however, this approach insures that the inference
will be preserved: More precisely, the presumption lingers on
to protect the inference from extinction, and the result in
the Rhode Island case described above is prevented. When
the opponent does introduce "substantial" or "uncontradict-
ed" evidence, then the presumption vanishes; whether an
inference remains now must be decided without reference to
the presumption." An inference might remain because the
basic fact is both relevant and sufficient evidence of the pre-
sumed fact; or there might be other proof in the case from
which the presumed fact could be inferred.
McCormick saw in this approach something more: The
jury, he thought, is not only left free to draw an inference of
the presumed fact, but is advised that there is a presumption
at work in the case, at least so long as the opponent's counter-
proof was only sufficient and not "substantial" or "uncon-
tradicted."'
The following cases seem to combine the notion that the counterproof
will dislodge the presumption only if it is "substantial" and "undisputed,"
employing widely varying terminology: Gaither v. Myers, 404 F.2d 216,
219 (D.C. Cir. 1968) ("uncontradicted" and "conclusive"); E. L. Cheeney
Co. v. Gates, 346 F.2d 197, 202 (5th Cir. 1965) ("clear, positive and sub-
stantially uncontradicted," whether from "interested" witnesses or not);
Smith v. Savannah Homes, 389 F. Supp. 384, 386 (W.D. Tenn. 1974) ("un-
contradicted, unimpeached"); Caldwell v. Wilson Freight Forwarding Co.,
322 F. Supp. 43, 45 (W.D. Pa. 1971) (quoting from a Pennsylvania deci-
sion that a presumption of employment and scope, arising from a showing
that defendant's name is on a commercial vehicle, "alone is sufficient under
Pennsylvania law to take the case to the jury 'unless the evidence to the
contrary is clear, positive, credible, uncontradicted and so indisputable in
weight and amount as to justify the court in holding that a verdict against
it must be set aside as a matter of law.'").
And see Jack Cole Co. v. Hudson, 409 F.2d 188, 192 (5th Cir. 1969),
collecting from state and federal cases a list of terms describing the kind
of proof which will cause rebuttable presumptions of ownership, agency,
and scope of employment to disappear. The terms include "strong and
clear," "positive and unequivocal," "uncontradicted or invulnerable," "clear
and undisputed," and "so clear that reasonable minds can draw but one
inference."
44. The description coincides with one of Morgan's. See Morgan, Foreword to
MODEL CODE OF EVIDENCE, at 56 (1942). In a later work, Morgan described
the same approach differently; see MORGAN, BASIC PROBLEMS OF EVIDENCE
34-35 (1962) and note 47 infra. McCormick's view seems to coincide with
the description in the text above, although he added the thought that until
"substantial" or "uncontradicted" counterproof was adduced, the trial
judge should make express mention of the presumption to the jury; see
MCCORMICK, EVIDENCE § 345 (2d ed. 1972).
45. McCoRMICK, EVIDENCE § 345 (2d ed. 1972) ("[M]any courts also hold that
the special policies behind the presumption require that the jury be in-
formed of its existence." [Citation to Grier and Krisher, infra, this note]) ;
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Most of the decisions endorsing this approach are af-
firmances of trial court judgments upon jury verdicts in
favor of the party for whom the presumption operated. What
the appellate court is saying to the appellant is this: "Your
counterproof may have been sufficient to support a finding of
the nonexistence of the presumed fact, but it cannot be said
to be 'substantial' or 'uncontradicted.' Accordingly, the pre-
sumption was not 'put to flight,' and at least an inference
remained in the case. The jury drew the inference, and you
have no ground for complaint."4
McCormick, Charges on Presumptions and Burden of Proof, 5 N.C.L. Rv.
291 (1972) (advocating an instruction to the jury upon the presumption, but
concluding that "almost the only" form of instruction that "seems to make
sense" is one under which the presumption affects the burden of persuasion"
-a view which is also advanced in the present edition of the McCormick
treatise: see note 3 supra).
See Grier v. Rosenberg, 213 Md. 248, 131 A.2d 737, 739 (1957) (Plain-
tiff claimed to have been injured while a passenger on a bus which came
to a sudden stop, allegedly as a result of the fact that defendant's car
"suddenly cut across the front of the bus at great speed." There was evi-
dence, stemming from proof of the license number of the offending vehicle,
that the car in fact belonged to defendant, but no proof whatever as to
the identity of the driver. To rebut the presumption of agency and scope
arising from proof of ownership, defendant testified that he did not recall
driving the vehicle at the time and place in question, and that none of his
employees recalled doing so either. Taking the view that the defendant's
counterproof was enough to preclude an instruction requiring the jury to
to find agency and scope, but not sufficient to require the contrary finding,
the Maryland Supreme Court found that trial judge committed reversible
error in refusing to instruct the jury that if it found that defendant owned
the automobile, then there was a rebuttable presumption of agency and
scope.) ; State of Maryland v. Baltimore Transit Co., 329 F.2d -738 (4th Cir.
1964) (In suit to recover for wrongful death of pedestrian, there was
conflicting eyewitness testimony on the question whether decedent was in
a pedestrian crosswalk with the light in his favor, or outside the crosswalk
with the light against him, at the time he was struck by defendant's bus.
Over a thoughtful dissent by Haynesworth, J., the majority, per Bell, C. J.,
applied Grier in concluding that the trial judge had erred in instructing
the jury that a presumption of due care existed, but that the jury should
not rely upon it in light of the counterproof, and that the jury should de-
cide the case on the evidence alone. In dissent, Haynesworth argued that
the jury should not be instructed on a presumption where there was no
basic fact in the case having probative worth on the issue of the presumed
fact if, as in this case, there was sufficient counterproof.) ; and Krisher
v. Duff, 331 Mich. 699, 50 N.W.2d 332, 339 (1951) (Reversible error to
refuse to charge the jury "that the defendant must come forward with
evidence of a clear, positive and credible nature to refute the presumptions
of knowledge or consent." No error, however, to refuse to mention to the
jury the existence of the statute creating the presumption.).
46. See, e.g., Cravey v. J. S. Gainer Pulpwood Co., Inc., 128 Ga.App. 465, 197
S.E.2d 171, 173 (1973) (no error in refusing to direct verdict for defen-
dant where the long-form scope-of-employment presumption was not over-
come as a matter of law by "'clear, positive, and uncontradicted evidence'
to the contrary") ; Breeding v. Massey, 378 F.2d 171, 176-77 (8th Cir. 1967)
(no error in refusal to instruct jury as a matter of law that driver was
not acting within the scope of his employment, for the defendant-employer's
counterproof did not overcome the presumption, since the jury was not
bound to accept the testimony of interested parties); Webb. v. Moreno, 363
F.2d 97, 99-101 (8th Cir. 1967) (proper to submit the issue of implied
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It is hard to fault a court which deviates this far from the
pristine version of the traditionalist approach to avoid the
absurdity of a presumption which disappears altogether in
the face of unbelieved counterproof. But this approach has
its problems. First, it employs a disturbingly vague concept:
We must try to recognize evidence which is "substantial" or
"uncontradicted," and which is at once more than "sufficient"
but less than "compelling." That is, we have now a kind of
proof which is more than enough to create a jury question,
less than enough to win a directed verdict (although many of
the decisions seem to indicate that "sufficient" or "uncon-
tradicted" really does mean "cogent and compelling"). Sec-
ond, in light of its modest goal, the approach may be wholly
unnecessary, at least in cases where the basic fact would sup-
port a finding of the presumed fact. Third, it is hard to
imagine what a jury is supposed to think if it is told that
there is a "presumption" in the case. Is the jury to find the
presumed fact or not? And if lawyers have difficulty under-
standing the word "presumption," what is a jury to make of
it? And fourth, although this seems more an academic than
a practical problem, the whole approach is extraordinarily
ambiguous. In the margin, I explore the various meanings
which this approach could have if a trial judge actually de-
cides that the counterproof is "sufficient" but not "sub-
stantial" or "uncontradicted," or that is "substantial" or
"uncontradicted" but not "compelling," or that it is "compel-
ling." 7 The range of theoretical possibilities is disconcerting.
consent to the jury, for the defendant's counterproof "fails to conclusively
establish no consent"); Caldwell v. Wilson Freight Forwarding Co., 322
F. Supp. 43, 45 (W.D. Pa. 1971) (Under Pennsylvania law, the scope-of-
employment presumption is sufficient to take the case to the jury in the
absence of counterproof of such strength to require a direction to find
against the presumed fact) ; and Hardy v. United States, 304 F. Supp. 855,
856-57 (N.D. Ga. 1969) (long-form scope-of-employment presumption
arises unless there is "undisputed evidence to the contrary," and here it
could not be said as a matter of law that driver was outside the scope of
his employment).
47. It seems that under the "substantial" or "uncontradicted" evidence ap-
proach, the counterproof could be of four different descriptions. Either (1)
it is insufficient to support a finding of the nonexistence of the presumed
fact (which includes the possibility that there is no counterproof at all), or
(2) it is sufficient to support a finding of the nonexistence of the pre-
sumed fact but not "substantial" or "uncontradicted," or (3) it is "sub-
stantial" or "uncontradicted," but not of such "cogent and compelling"
force as to require the jury to be directed to find that the presumed fact
does not exist, or (4) it is "cogent and compelling," and the jury should
be directed to find the fact. Only if the counterproof fits in categories 1
or 4 is it clear what the jury should be told. Here are all the possibilities:
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1. No evidence of nonexistence of presumed fact has been introduced,
or at most insufficient evidence to support a jury finding thereof:
A. The presumption controls the issue, and the jury should be in-
structed that it must find the existence of the presumed fact.
Here all would agree.
2. Sufficient evidence of the nonexistence of the presumed fact has
been introduced to support a jury finding thereof, but not "substantial" or"uncontradicted" evidence:
B. Presumption still controls. Jury should be instructed to find
the existence of the presumed fact. When it is said that only
only "substantial" or "uncontradicted" evidence can dislodge
the presumption, what is meant is that the presumption oper-
ates with full force until counterproof of that calibre is ad-
duced. This seems a doubtful interpretation, but see MORGAN,
BASIC PROBLEMS OF EVIDENCE 34-35 (1962).
C. Presumption no longer controls decision, but the jury should
be instructed that a "presumption" exists, rather than told
nothing about it, and rather than told only of an inference.
See the cases cited in note 45, supra. When it is said that it
takes "substantial" or "uncontradieted" evidence to dislodge a
presumption, what is meant is that it takes counterproof of
such calibre to destroy the presumption altogether. Evidence
of lesser calibre, so long as it is "sufficient" to support a
finding of the nonexistence of the presumed fact, will deprive
the presumption of its "mandatory" effect, although the jury
will still learn of the "presumption" as such.
D. Presumption no longer controls decision, but the jury should be
allowed to draw an inference, and perhaps told that it may
draw such an inference. Again, when it is said that it takes
"substantial" or "uncontradicted" evidence to dislodge a pre-
sumption, what is meant is that it takes counterproof of such
calibre to destroy the presumption altogether. Evidence of less-
er calibre, so long as it is "sufficient" to support a finding of
the nonexistence of the presumed fact, deprives the presumption
of its mandatory effect, but does not destroy the presumption,
which has the continuing role of protecting an inference from
extinction. See Morgan, Foreword to MODEL CODE OF EVIDENCE
56 (1942). And see the cases cited at notes 13 and 46, supra.
3. "Substantial" or "uncontradicted" evidence of the nonexistence of
the presumed fact has been introduced, but not evidence which is so "cogent
and compelling" as to require that the jury be directed to find that the
presumed fact does not exist:
E. Presumption no longer controls decision, but the jury should be
instructed that a "presumption" exists, rather than told nothing
about it, and rather than told only of an inference. When it is
said that "substantial" or "uncontradicted" evidence will dis-
lodge a presumption, what is meant is that evidence of such
calibre will deprive the presumption of its mandatory effect.
Even when such evidence is introduced, however, the jury should
be told of the existence of a presumption in the case, for nothing
in the "substantial" or "uncontradicted" evidence standard im-
plies that the judge will decide whether the evidence is of such
calibre, and it is up to the jury to decide this. See Krisher v.
Duff. 331 Mich. 699, 50 N.W.2d 332, 339 (1951), cited supra
note 45.
F. Presumption no longer controls, but the jury should be allowed
to draw an inference, and perhaps told that it may draw such
an inference. When it is said that "substantial" or "uncontra-
dicted" evidence dislodges a presumption, what is meant is that
such evidence of such calibre deprives the presumption of its
mandatory effect. Even when evidence of such calibre is intro-
duced, however, enough of the presumption survives to protect
an inference from extinction. See Caldwell v. Wilson Freight
Forwarding Co., 322 F. Supp. 43, 45 (W.D. Pa. 1971), cited
supra note 43.
G. Presumption no longer controls, but an inference may or may
not remain, depending upon whether the basic fact of the pre-
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3. The "Believe-The-Evidence" Approach."'
The principal virtue of this variant from the pris-
tine version of traditionalist theory is that it involves the
jury in the assessment of the counterproof, allowing the pre-
sumption to have an effect if the counterproof is not believed.
Under this approach, it is said that the presumption remains
"in abeyance" until the jury decides whether it believes the
counterproof, but that it will "still operate" if the jury dis-
believes the counterproof. s
sumption has sufficient inherent probative worth to support an
inference of the existence of the presumed fact. If such an
inference does remain, perhaps the jury should be told that it
may draw such an inference. See Morgan, Foreword to MODEL
CODE OF EVIDENCE, at 56 (1942).
H. Presumption no longer controls, and any underlying inference
is destroyed too. When it is said that "substantial" or "un-
contradicted" evidence dislodges a presumption, what is meant
is that evidence of such calibre destroys the presumption al-
together, and that means that any underlying inference is
destroyed too.
4. "Cogent and compelling" evidence of the nonexistence of the presum-
ed fact has been introduced:
I. Both the presumption and any underlying inference are de-
stroyed. The jury should be instructed that it must find the
nonexistence of the presumed fact. Here all would agree.
Assuming that there is a consensus that Situation 1 calls for Response
A, and that Situation 4 calls for Response I, the question becomes what
Response is appropriate in Situation 2, and what in Situation 3. Rationally,
the path from A to I can traverse the intervening possibilities in any one
of six different ways: (1) A, B, E, I; (2) A, B, G, I (which seems to
have been Morgan's choice at one time; see MORGAN, BASIC PROBLEMS OF
EVIDENCE 34-35 (1962)); (3) A, B, H-I (where the jurisdiction treats "sub-
stantial" and "uncontradicted" evidence as equivalent to "cogent and com-
pelling" evidence); (4) A, C-E, I (which seems to be what McCormick had
in mind; see McCORMICK, EVIDENCE § 343 (2d ed. 1972) ; and see the Grier
and Krisher cases, supra note 45); (5) A, D, G, and I (which seems to
have been Morgan's choice at another time; see Morgan, Foreword to
MODEL CODE OF EVIDENCE 56 (1942)) ; and finally (6) A, D, H-I (where,
once again, the jurisdiction treats "substantial" and "uncontradicted" evi-
dence as equivalent to "cogent and compelling" evidence).
48. Gillett v. Michigan United Traction Co., 205 Mich. 410, 171 N.W. 536, 538-
40 (1919) (In affirming a directed verdict for defendant in a personal
injury case, the Court considered in dictum what effect a presumption of
due care would have had in the case if the accident had caused death
rather than injury. The Court concluded that the presumption would cease
to operate upon introduction of "direct, positive, and credible" counterproof
showing decedent's negligence, but that if the jury were to believe that this
counterproof "has been overcome by other evidence and should be disre-
garded, the presumption will . . . still operate." And: "[Ilf, uninfluenced
by the presumption, [the jury reaches] the conclusion that the evidence
tending to show decedent's negligence is not entitled to credit and should
be disregarded, the presumption may then be considered as remaining in
force so far as may be necessary to establish the fact that the deceased
exercised proper care in all respects not expressly established by the evi-
dence. It was not entirely displaced, but remained in abeyance pending the
jury's reaching this preliminary decision as to the credence to be given
the evidence on the particular point in which negligence was claimed.").
49. For reasons which escape my understanding, Morgan once thought that
the "believe-the-evidence" approach was actually two approaches. See
Morgan, Instructing the Jury Upon Presumptions and Burden of Proof, 47
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In a particular and limiting context, the Connecticut
Supreme Court seemingly endorsed this approach." The case
involved a lawsuit arising out of a two-car accident, in which
plaintiff sought damages from the owner of an automobile
driven at the time by the owner's son. Plaintiff had no evi-
dence that the son had the defendant's permission to drive on
the occasion in question, and relied upon a statutory pre-
sumption, arising upon proof that the driver was in the im-
mediate family of the owner, that the vehicle was a "family
car" and that the driver had the owner's permission to drive
and was acting within the scope of his authority on the occa-
sion in question. Both the son and the father testified that
the son did not have permission to drive, and the father testi-
fied that the car was not maintained for general use by family
members. There was also proof that the son had taken the
car while both his parents were at home, and that the father,
upon hearing of the accident, "evinced no surprise," nor had
he thereafter "upbraided the son for taking the car." The
appellate court affirmed the jury verdict for the plaintiff:
We conclude that the intent of the statute is that
the presumption shall avail the plantiff until such
time as the trier finds proven the circumstances
of the situation with reference to the use made of
the car and the authority of the person operating it
to drive it, leaving the burden then upon the plain-
tiff to establish, in view of the facts so found, that
the car was being operated at the time as a family
car .... It is evident from the trial court's memo-
randum of decision that it did not construe the
statute as we have done, because it stated that even
if the testimony of these two witnesses was dis-
believed the plaintiff would not be entitled to re-
cover.
5 1
HARV. L. Ray. 59, 61 (1933) (Here he suggested these alternative views of
the "believe-the-evidence" approach. Either: "[A presumption] places
upon the opponent the burden of persuading the jury to believe so much
of the evidence against the presumed fact as would justify a reasonable
jury in finding against that fact." Or: "[A presumption] places upon the
opponent the burden of persuading the jury not to disbelieve so much of the
evidence against the presumption as to leave the remainder insufficient
to justify a reasonable jury in finding against the presumed fact."). In
the end he insisted on the distinction still, but seemed to suggest that it
was not important to consider the possibilities, since "no court now actually
applies such a theory." MORGAN, BASIC PROBLEMS OF EVIDENCE 40 (1962).
50. O'Dea v. Amodeo, 118 Conn. 58, 170 A. 486 (1934).
51. Id. at 488-89.
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Other cases appearing to subscribe to this view are cited in the
margin." Some pattern jury instructions seem also to take
this approach."
This variant presents insuperable difficulties. In
the first place, it seems to turn upon the notion that the
counterproof will be circumstantial in character, so that
putting upon the opponent the burden of convincing the jury
that the facts offered in counterproof are true is not quite
the same thing as putting on the opponent the burden of per-
suasion on the presumed fact itself.5 But what a tenuous dis-
tinction it is! Surely the opponent will always adduce the
best counterproof he has, and if circumstantial evidence is
the best he has, then it will be but cold comfort to assure
him that he does not bear the burden of disproving the pre-
sumed fact if he does bear the burden of proving the circum-
stances which he thinks are favorable to his cause.
In the second place, this approach can only hope to work
at all if the counterproof is relatively compact in nature. If
52. Sutphen v. Hagelin, 32 Conn. 158, 344 A.2d 270 (1975) (indicating that
"family car" presumption does not disappear upon introduction of counter-
proof tending to show that the car was not being used by an agent of the
owner, but that the presumption applies if the jury disbelieves the counter-
proof; good collection of Connecticut authorities) ; Provident Tradesmens
Bank & Trust Co. v. Lumbermens Mut. Cas. Co., 411 F.2d 88, 96 n.26 (3d
Cir. 1969) (approving an instruction to the jury describing the presump-
tion and emphasizing that the jury must decide whether it believes the
owner's counterproof), Clark v. Diefendorf, 109 Conn. 507, 147 A. 33, 34
(1929) (indicating that if the facts of the counterproof are themselves in
issue, the jury should be instructed that the presumed fact "would be
implied" from the basic fact if the jury finds the facts in the counterproof
"not to exist").
53. SeO WASHINGTON PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS (Civil) § 24.03 (1967):
[If you find] [Since] (the basic facts), the law presumes
-.- ---. (the presumed fact). You must therefore find
(the presumed fact) unless you believe evidence which you find
reasonably tends to prove that -_ (the presumed fact is
not so). If you believe evidence which you find reasonably tends
to prove that (the presumed fact is not so), then you will
disregard the presumption and decide from all the evidence, and all
reasonable inferences therefrom, whether the [plaintiff] [defen-
dant] has established by a preponderance of the evidence that
(the presumed fact is so).
And see 1 NEw YORK PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS § 1:63 (1974) (presump-
tion against suicide in suit to recover on accident or double indemnity
policy, where plaintiff bears burden of proof on issue of accident) ; and Id.,
vol. 2, § 4.57 (presumption against suicide in suit upon life insurance policy
where suicide means non-recovery).
54. Thus, in the passage from O'Dea quoted in the text above, the court makes
it clear that when the facts of the counterproof are established, it leaves
"the burden upon the plaintiff to establish" (emphasis added) the pre-
sumed fact.
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the opponent's attack upon the presumed fact involves ten
circumstantial facts, and if he bears the burden of persuading
the jury to believe just enough of those ten facts to justify a
finding of the nonexistence of the presumed fact, then the
trial judge faces a stultifying task. He must determine, in-
dividually and in combination, the facts adduced by the pre-
sumption's opponent which would suffice to support a finding
of the nonexistence of the presumed fact, and then devise a
charge to the jury to the effect that it should find the pre-
sumed fact unless it believes those facts which would suffice
to support the contrary finding.5 In other contexts, of
course, the trial judge may have to determine just what facts
the jury must find in order to support a verdict, but this ap-
proach would compel the judge to break down the evidence
even further than is required in the preparation of interroga-
tories to the jury, and the charge upon the presumption will
become unwieldy indeed.
4. The "Equipoise" Approach."
Under this variant, the presumption will control the
decision on the presumed fact unless, on the basis of all
the evidence in the case, the jury finds that the nonexistence
of the presumed fact is at least as probable as its existence.
Like the "substantial" or "uncontradicted" evidence ap-
proach, this one allows the force of the presumption to keep
the inference alive, even in the face of sufficient counterproof
to support a finding of its nonexistence. But there is no
need to puzzle the jury by using the word "presumption,"
55. See Morgan, Instructing the Jury Upon Presumptions and Burden of Proof,
4-7 HARV. L. REV. 59, 69-71 (1933).
56. Opinions vary upon the merits of this approach. Morgan thought the ap-
proach posed no "serious" difficulty, Morgan, Instructing the Jury Upon
Presumptions and Burden of Proof, 47 HARv. L. REv. 59, 70 (1933), but
that the only advantage of the approach was that it "does not violate the
dogma that the burden of proof never shifts," Morgan, Foreword to MODEL
CODE OF EVIDENCE 57 (1942). McCormick termed the "equipoise" approach
"[m]ore attractive theoretically" than the other variations of traditionalist
thinking, but thought it "hard to phrase" an instruction embodying this
approach "without conveying the impression that the presumption is itself
'evidence' which must be 'met' or 'balanced.'" He also thought that such
an instruction would convey an "impression of futility" in that it "pre-
scribes a difficult metaphysical task for the jury, and, in actual use, may
mystify rather than help the average juror." MCCORMICK, EVIDENCE § 345
(2d ed. 1972). Cleary thought the approach "unduly refined and unrealistic
when viewed within the framework of the actual trial," and complained that
"it simply fails to give presumptions a sufficient effect." Cleary, -upra
note 1, at 20.
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and no need to define a new category of proof called "substan-
tial" or "uncontradicted" proof. Like the "belief" approach,
this one involves the jury in the assessment of the strength of
the counterproof, and allows the presumption to have con-
tinuing effect if the jury discredits the counterproof. But
the nature of the instruction to the jury is compact and
simple, and the approach in no way affects the burden of
persuasion.
This approach was expressly endorsed in a number of
decisions by the Supreme Court of Maine ;57 there is support
for it in opinions by Justice Blume in Wyoming;"s there is
scattered support for the approach in other states."
57. In addition to the Hinds case, infra note 60, see Ruebsamen v. Maddocks,
340 A.2d 31, 36-37 (Me. 1975); Levasseur v. Field, 332 A.2d 765, 768 (Me.
1975) ; Sargent v. Raymond F. Sargent, Inc., 295 A.2d 35, 37-38 (Me. 1972) ;
and Metcalf v. Marine Colloids, Inc., 285 A.2d 367, 368 (Me. 1972). Maine
has now adopted its own version of Uniform Rule 301. See note 92 infra.
58. See First Nat'l Bank v. Ford, 30 Wyo. 110, 216 P. 691, 694 (1923) (care-
fully noting that the burden of proof always rests upon the party with the
affirmative, but noting too that when such party establishes a prima facie
case the opponent has the burden of producing evidence such that the prima
facie case is "balanced," or "put in equipoise') ; Hildebrand v. Chicago, B.
& Q.R.R., 45 Wyo. 175, 17 P.2d 651, 653-655 (1933) (In a suit against a
railroad to recover damages for the death of cattle run over by defendant's
train, plaintiff claimed the benefit of a presumption, based upon a statute
(now WYO. STAT. § 37-210 (1957)) requiring railroads to maintain ade-
quate fences, gates, and cattle guards. Proof that defendant's trains ran
over the cattle amounted to a "prima facie case," which the Supreme Court
also referred to as a "presumption": "[M] erely some evidence on the part of
the railroad company is not sufficient to cause the presumption to vanish,
but it must be adequate to meet, that is to say, to balance, the prima facie
case, unless, perchance, all the facts are shown in detail. A gentle tapping
on a window pane will not break it; so a mere attempt to refute a pre-
sumption should not cause it to vanish, if it is of any value at all."); and
Worth v. Worth, 48 Wyo. 441, 49 P.2d 629 (1935) (Alienation case brought
by wife against parents of husband; held, the court should have instructed
the jury on the presumption that parents advise their children in good
faith. The judge is not the arbiter of the question whether the evidence
suffices to make the presumption disappear and this question should be left
to the jury unless the counterproof prevails as a matter of law. The opinion
also quotes Morgan's description of the "equipoise" rule with apparent
approval.).
59. See, e.g., Klunk v. Hocking Valley Ry., 74 Ohio St. 125, 77 N.E. 752, 755
(1906) (Railroader injured by exploding pressure gauge makes a prima
facie case for recovery under state statute by showing these facts. While
such a showing does not cause the burden of proof to shift to the railroad,
nevertheless: "[I]f upon the whole case defendant's negligence was not
established by a preponderance of the evidence, or if upon all the evidence
adduced upon that issue, the case was left in equipoise, the defendant was
entitled to a verdict, and the jury should have been so charged.") ; Tresise
v. Ashdown, 118 Ohio St. 307, 160 N.E. 898, 900 (1928) (Where plaintiff's
own evidence raises a "presumption" of contributory negligence on his
part, he need not overcome that presumption by a preponderance of counter-
proof, but must produce only "such proof as is sufficient merely to equal
or counterbalanc the evidence," citing Klunk, supra). Klunk and Treaise
were followed, in the context of cases in which plaintiff's proof raised the
possibility of contributory negligence on his part, in Batesole v. Stratford,
505 F.2d 804. 811 (6th Cir. 1974); New York Cent. R.R. v. Monroe, 188 F.
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The leading decision in Maine is Hinds v. John Hancock
Mutual Life Insurance Co.,6" which was a suit on a life in-
surance policy to recover double indemnity. There was no
dispute over the fact of death, and the obligation of the car-
rier to the beneficiary in the amount of $9000. There was
a question, however, as to whether the insured had died ac-
cidentally or by suicide, and plaintiff bore the burden of show-
ing accident rather than suicide as the cause of death. The
case went to the jury, which found in plaintiff's favor, but
the Supreme Court of Maine reversed, finding that "there
was an uncontradicted showing by strong evidence of physical
facts drawn from disinterested witnesses presented by plain-
tiff that the death was self-inflicted and non-accidential."
Although the holding made a discussion of the proper ap-
proach to presumptions strictly speaking unnecessary, the
Court in Hinds discussed the proper effect to be given to the
presumption against suicide which operated in plaintiff's
favor:
Supp. 826, 834 (S.D.N.Y. 1960); Hawkins v. Graber, 112 Ohio App. 509,
176 N.E.2d 600, 602-603 (1960); Shapiro v. Kilgore Cleaning & Storage
Co., 108 Ohio App. 402, 156 N.E.2d 866, 872 (1959) ; and Carter v. Cummins,
76 Ohio L. Abs. 490, 148 N.E.2d 123, 126-127 (1957).
Elsewhere, however, Ohio seems either to have ignored the Klunk-
Tresise holdings (see In re Guardianship of Breece, 173 Ohio St. 542, 184
N.E.2d 386, 395 (1962)), to have held that a presumption affects the bur-
den of persuasion (see In re Walker's Estate, 161 Ohio St. 564, 120 N.E.2d
432, 435 (1954)), or to have rejected Klunk-Tresise at least by implication
(see Ayers v. Woodard, 166 Ohio St. 138, 140 N.E.2d 401, 406 (195-7):
presumption disappears upon introduction of counterproof, although bur-
den is upon opponent to introduce "evidence of a substantial nature which
at least counterbalances the presumption, [and] then it disappears" (em-
phasis added)). And see 1 OHIO JURY INSTRUCTIONS § 5.13 (1968) ("It
has been mentioned that there is a presumption of law that .... This pre-
sumption does not apply in this case because evidence was introduced on
this issue. . . . It may not be given any weight or considered for any pur-
pose in reaching your verdict."). However, see id. § 9.11 (instruction entirely
consistent with Tresise for situation in which plaintiff's own proof shows
possibility of contributory negligence), and § 15.31 (Instruction on short-
form loaned automobile presumption, where owner is an occupant of the
car, to the effect that the presumption justifies a finding of the driver's
agency unless "overcome" or "rebutted" by evidence to the contrary).
And see Diller v. Northern California Power Co., 18 Cal. App. 426, 123
P. 359 (1912) (approval of instruction to jury that a presumption of
defendant's negligence, arising from proof that a live electric wire was
down across the road, is overcome if defendant produces sufficient evidence
to balance it) ; and Speck v. Sarver, 20 Cal. 2d 585, 128 P.2d 16, 20 (1942)
(Traynor, J., dissenting, and arguing that a presumption continues until
the party against whom it operates introduces evidence persuading the jury
that the nonexistence of the presumed fact is as probable as its existence).
Cf. Beggs v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 219 Iowa 24, 257 N.W. 445
(1934) (when evidence is in equipoise, the presumption should turn the
decision in favor of the existence of the presumed fact).
60. 155 Me. 349, 155 A.2d 721 (1959).
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[Professor Morgan], while suggesting that [pre-
sumptions] should be permitted to shift the burden
of persuasion, sees no serious or insurmountable ob-
jection to the establishment of a single procedural
rule that a disputable presumption persists until the
contrary evidence persuades the factfinder that the
balance of probabilities is in equilibrium, or, stated
otherwise, until the evidence satisfies the jury or
factfinder that it is as probable that the presumed
fact does not exist as that it does exist. We view the
adoption of such a rule as a practical solution of a
confusing procedural problem. In establishing the
vanishing point for presumptions, it provides more
certainty than do the varying definitions of "sub-
stantial countervailing evidence". It has also the
virtue of reserving to the factfinder decisions as to
veracity, memory, and weight of testimony when-
ever they are in issue. In essence, the proposed rule
recognizes that when an inference has hardened
into a presumption compelling a finding in the ab-
sence of contrary evidence, it has achieved a status
which should not vanish at the first "tapping on the
window pane." It recognizes that "surely the
courts do not raise such a presumption merely for
the purpose of making the opponent of the presump-
tion cause words to be uttered." We agree with Mr.
Morgan that our objective should be to devise a
"simple, sensible and workable" plan for the pro-
cedural use of disputable presumptions and are sat-
isfied that the suggested rule achieves that end.
Such a rule gives to the presumption itself max-
imum coercive force short of shifting the burden of
persuasion. Although we are keenly aware that
there is severe criticism by respected authority of
the widely accepted rule that the burden of persua-
sion on an issue never shifts, that rule has been thor-
oughly imbedded in the law of this state. An un-
broken line of judicial pronouncements to this effect
are to be found in our opinions. We would be most
reluctant to make a radical change in the accepted
rule unless forced to do so by some compelling logic.
We feel no such compulsion here .... [It does not
seem] to us necessary, in order to bring some order
out of chaos, to overrule all precedent and permit
the presumption to shift the burden of persuasion
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from him who first proposes the issue and seeks to
change the status quo. These considerations
prompt us to adopt the foregoing rule which seems
to us a satisfactory middle course.
The rule for which we have expressed prefer-
ence does not, as we interpret it, mean that the per-
sistence or disappearance of a disputable presump-
tion may never be resolved as a matter of law.
Whenever no countervailing evidence is offered or
that which is offered is but a scintilla, or amounts to
no more than speculation and surmise, the presumed
fact will stand as though proven and the jury will be
so instructed. On the other hand, when the contrary
evidence comes from such sources and is of such a
nature that rational and unprejudiced minds could
not reasonably or properly differ as to the non-
existence of the presumed fact, the presumption will
disappear as a matter of law. Where proof of the
presumed fact is an essential element of the plain-
tiff's case, he would suffer the consequence of a di-
rected verdict. Such would ordinarily be the result,
for example, when evidence effectively rebutting
the presumption is drawn from admissions by the
plaintiff, evidence from witnesses presented and
vouched for by the plaintiff, or from uncontroverted
physical or documentary evidence."
5. The Presumption-As-Evidence Approach.
Under this variant form, a presumption is treated
as a kind of evidence, to be "weighed" against and in the
light of the other evidence in the case. A standard work on
jury instructions for the federal courts appears to equate
presumptions with evidence, endorsing the following lan-
guage:
A presumption continues to exist only so long as it
is not overcome or outweighed by evidence in the
case to the contrary; but unless and until out-
weighed, the jury should find in accordance with
the presumption.2
61. Id. at 730-32.
62. 2 DsVTT & BLACKMAR, FEDEmAL JURY PRACTICE AND INSTRUCTIONS § 71.04
(2d ed. 1970). In addition to treating the presumption as if it were evi-
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Treating a presumption as evidence does not really define an
approach, but is rather a technique which could be used in
conjunction with one of the other approaches described above.
The problem with treating a presumption as evidence is
that it results in a directive to compare factual data with
a legal rule, or a prescribed way of looking at data, and then
to weigh the data and the rule against one another." Where
the basic fact underlying the presumption is itself at least
sufficient evidence of the presumed fact, without regard to
the presumption, then it is only inaccurate to describe the
presumption as evidence, and the inaccuracy may not be too
serious; where the basic fact is not established, or is not itself
sufficient as evidence of the presumed fact, then equating
the presumption with evidence is not only inaccurate, but it
must also truly confound and confuse anybody who thinks
hard about the directive. There are still courts which treat
dence, the instruction quoted above seems to shift the burden of persua-
sion. The realization of the latter fact seems to have struck home in Colo-
rado. See COLORADO JURY INSTRUCTIONS (Civil) § 3:5 (1969):
"Presumptions" are rules based upon experience or public
policy and established in the law to assist the jury in ascertaining
the truth. Presumptions take the place of evidence unless and
until outweighed by evidence to the contrary.
In this case the law presumes that (insert a description of the
presumption).
Unless and until the presumption is outweighed by evidence
to the contrary, you must find in accordance with the presumption.
In accompanying "Notes on Use," there is an admonition that the above-
quoted instruction should only be employed with "rebuttable presumptions
which shift the burden of proof as well as the burden of going forward."
See id. (Supp. June, 1976). A new instruction, "to be used with rebuttable
presumptions which shift only the burden of going forward and do not
shift the burden of disproving the presumed fact," has been proposed for
Colorado, and it adopts the traditionalist approach in its pristine form.
See id. § 3:5A (Supp. June, 1976).
63. See Gausewitz, supra note 3, at 333-34 (" '[P]resumption' means a rule of
law about the effect of evidence that merely fixes the burden of producing
evidence. This rule of law cannot be evidence for the reason that it is
psychologically impossible to weigh a rule of law against evidence. But . . .
the basic fact may be evidence and this criticism applies only to cases in
which the courts have found both (1) that the basic fact will not support
an inference, and (2) that the presumption has been rebutted."); MC-
CORMICK, EVIDENCE § 345 (2d ed. 1972) ("Another solution, formerly more
popular than now, is to instruct the jury that the presumption is 'evidence,'
to be weighed and considered with the testimony in the case. This avoids
the danger that the jury may infer that the presumption is conclusive,
but it probably means little to the jury, and certainly runs counter to ac-
cepted theories of the nature of evidence."); and Memorandum prepared
by the Standing Committee on Rules of Evidence, submitted to the Senate
Judiciary Committee by letter from Judge Roszel C. Thompson to Senator
James 0. Eastland, May 22, 1974, Hearing on H.R. 5463 Before the Senate
Comm. on the Judiciary, 93d Cong., 2d Sess., at 54, 56 (1974) ("Presump-
tions are not evidence but ways of dealing with evidence. This basic dif-
ference is not susceptible of being eliminated by legislative fiat.").
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presumptions as evidence, though the number seems to be de-
clining. The practice was rejected by statute in California,
which had previously followed it; 4 the manner of the en-
actment of Federal Rule 301 makes it entirely clear that the
Congress intended to disapprove the presumption-as-evidence
rule for the federal courts.6 5 (And of course there would be
no sense at all in treating a presumption as evidence under
Uniform Rule 301, since the latter gives to presumptions the
effect of allocating the burden of persuasion.)
Perhaps here is the place to call attention to the quota-
tion set out at the beginning of this article. Under any of the
last four variant modes of traditionalist thinking, it seems
that the behavior of presumptions resembles that of "bursting
bubbles," "bats of the law," or "male bees" not nearly so
much as that of the Cheshire cat. Under the approaches de-
scribed above the presumption too leaves behind something of
itself; it too leaves behind something which cannot be viewed
without reference to that which had been there before; it too
disappears only slowly, and in stages, and not suddenly or all
at once.
In sum, traditionalist thinking has not produced any-
thing like a "one-rule world" for presumptions," nor has it
served well the supposed "procedural justice" ideal of pro-
viding certainty with respect to the operation of presump-
tions. What it has produced is a myriad of approaches, all
striving to give more effect to presumption than the pristine
version of traditionalist theory would allow, while clinging
still to the dogma that the presumption does not affect the
burden of persuasion.
B. The Reformist Approach: Full
Effect for Underlying Policies
At the heart of reformist thinking is the conviction that
if a presumption has force enough to control decision upon
64. See CAL. Evm. CODE § 600 (West 1966) (providing in pertinent part that
"A presumption is not evidence."), repudiatnig the contrary rule of Smellie
v. Southern Pac. Co., 212 Cal. 540, 299 P. 529 (1931) ; and Speck v. Sarver,
20 Cal.2d 585, 128 P.2d 16 (1942).
65. See note 97 infra.
66. See Gausewitz, 8upra note 3, pa~sim.
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the presumed fact in the absence of counterproof-and of
the truth of this one point all seem convinced-then it must
be strong enough to require a finding of the existence of the
presumed fact when counterproof has been adduced, but upon
all the evidence the trier of fact is unable to say yea or nay
on the existence of the presumed fact. Put in fewer words,
the reformist view holds that a device which breaks a dead-
lock in the absence of proof should also indicate which side
should prevail where an abundance of proof fails to persuade
the trier of fact either way.
The reformist view is supported by the weight of both
practical and theoretical considerations.
Implicitly, at least, the practical considerations have
already been explored. 7 Time and again courts have refused
to follow the pristine version of traditionalist thinking, re-
storing instead to any one or more of the four different ways
around it explored previously. The result is that tradition-
alist thinking only pretends to provide us with a one-rule
world, and instead gives rise to a many-rule world, and each
variant from the pristine version of traditionalist thinking
is harder to apply and think about than the reformist view.
After all, the idea of a burden of persuasion is entirely
familiar, easy to understand, and applied day after day in
cases upon cases which are submitted to juries.
As a matter of sound theory, the reformist view is the
better one, despite some oft-mentioned practical objections.
Whenever a presumption rests upon public policy in whole or
in part, that policy is underserved if the presumption dis-
appears in the face of unbelieved counterproof in such man-
ner that nothing of the strength of the policy is carried for-
ward to the jury in the judge's charge-in other words, if
the presumption does less than affect the burden of persua-
sion. Quite possibly the same is true where the only underly-
ing reason for the presumption is the special procedural
policy arising from the relative accessibility of the proof as
between the parties, or the absence of proof; perhaps the
67. See the text of Part II, supra,
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same is also true where the only underlying reason for the
presumption is the intrinsic probative worth of the basic
fact as evidence of the presumed fact, although in this in-
stance the need to give effect to reformist thinking is con-
siderably reduced. If these ideas sound impractical, or if
they seem to reek of the ivory tower, I submit that it can be so
only for two reasons. First, the profession (bench, bar, and
particularly law professors) has lost track of the reasons for
allocating, in the first instance, the burden of persuasion to
one party or another-and these turn out to be identical to
the reasons for creating presumptions. Second, the profes-
sion is unduly impressed with the notion that the burden of
persuasion never "shifts"-a principle resting upon two un-
derlying reasons (that the litigants should know from the
beginning who bears the burden of persuasion on what issues,
and that jury instructions should be kept simple), neither of
which would be undermined by the reformist approach.
Consider in more detail the second of the abovementioned
arguments-that less effect than the reformist view would
require disserves the policy basis of presumptions. Assume
a suit upon a policy insuring against accidental death, or
one upon a policy of life insurance providing for double in-
demnity if the insured dies by accidental rather than natural
causes. In the first instance, suicide typically means no re-
covery, and often it is plaintiff who bears the burden of prov-
ing accident as the cause of death. In the second case, suicide
bars double indemnity, though maybe not recovery of the face
amount of the policy, and again the plaintiff bears the burden
of persuasion on the issue of suicide as the cause of death.68
68. Sometimes a life insurance policy contains a clause exempting the carrier
from liability in the event of suicide by the insured, in which case suicide
is generally considered an affirmative defense, and the burden of persua-
sion on this issue rests upon the insurance carrier. See 19 COUCH, INSUR-
ANCE § 79:454 (2d ed. 1968); 21 APPLEMAN, INSURANCE LAW AND PRACCE
§ 12151 (1962). In the absence of such a clause, it seems that suicide does
not prevent recovery on a life insurance policy. See 1 APPLEMAN, supra
§ 367. Where suicide is advanced as a defense to recovery on a life insur-
ance policy, there is no sense in invoking the presumption against suicide:
Allocating to the carrier the burden of proving suicide already accomplishes
everything that the presumption could accomplish-more, if the presumption
is handled in the traditionalist manner. Sometimes, however, the signifi-
cance of this fact is overlooked. See 21 APPLEMAN, supra, § 12155; and
see Worth v. Worth, 48 Wyo. 441, 49 P.2d 629 (1935) (in another context,
presumption instruction should be given even though the presumption works
against the party bearing the burden of persuasion). And see note 106,
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In each case, plaintiff has benefit of a presumption against
suicide, if it be established (as it usually can be) that the
insured met his death in a violent manner. If defendant in-
troduces counterproof sufficient to support a finding of sui-
cide-perhaps proof that the deceased was despondent, or
"tired of it all," or perhaps just proof from the physical cir-
cumstances surrounding the death, which may even come in
through plaintiff's own witnesses-then by the pristine ver-
sion of the traditionalist theory the presumption is gone al-
together, and perhaps the case will not even go to the
jury. If it does, then the jury will be instructed that plaintiff
bears the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evi-
dence that accident rather than suicide was the cause of death,
and that if the proof should fail by preponderance of the
evidence to show that death was accidental, then the jury
should find in favor of defendant.
The jury instruction described above in no way carries
forward the serious policy of the law to minimize the num-
ber of instances in which a judicial determination of suicide
will impose human suffering upon the family of the decedent,
nor the policy which favors the financial protection of the
beneficiaries through payment of insurance rather than the
frustration of such preplanned protection. These policies-
and the probability that violent death is accidental when the
physical circumstances are consistent with either accident
or suicide--control decision in the absence of sufficient
counterproof to support a finding of suicide. How are these
policies served if a jury faithful to the charge of the trial
judge must find suicide where it believes that the evidence
in the case is insolubly ambiguous-that all the evidence con-
sidered, it is simply unable to say that the proof preponderates
in either direction? The answer is that the policies are
not served at all, for traditionalist thinking lets slip away,
inIra. It is in suits to recover double indemnity, where such recovery
depends upon proof of death by accident, and in suits to recover on poli-
cies which insure against accidental death or injury (as opposed to life
insurance policies) that the presumption of accidental death, or the pre-
sumption against death by suicide, comes into play, and here it is useful
because it works on behalf of the party who bears the burden of proof. See
generally 19 CoUcH, supra § 79:319, and 21 APPLEMAN, supra §§ 1215q,
12158.
1977 263
LAND AND WATER LAW REVIEW
out of sight, the instrument which serves these policies. Un-
duly impressed with "bursting bubble" imagery, with thought
that the burden of proof never "shifts," and with the belief
that the burden of proof is on him who bears the "affirma-
tive," we forget the purpose behind the presumption alto-
gether.
A second example is in order. Plaintiff bailor demon-
strates for the trier of fact that he bailed goods with defen-
dant bailee, and that upon retrieving the goods plaintiff
found them damaged. On these facts arises a presumption
that it was the negligence of the bailee which caused the
damage.6" If bailee introduces counterproof sufficient to
support a finding that he exercised due care, probably the
case will still go to the jury, but once again under tradition-
alist thinking the jury will be advised that it is plaintiff who
bears the burden of persuading the jury by a preponderance
of the evidence that it was negligence of the defendant which
caused the damage, and that if a preponderance does not
show negligence, then the jury should find for the defendant
and against the plaintiff. Again, nothing in the instruction
carries forward the policy of the law to require the bailee
to explain what happened-a policy based on the premise that
in the typical case the bailee alone will have access to the
proof and that in many cases we would prefer to make the
bailee accountable on a fairly strict standard of care. These
policies have not vanished when the counterproof has been
adduced-and remember that they were considered strong
enough to control decision in the absence of counterproof
showing due care-but again they have slipped out of sight,
and the instrument by which the policies were enforced has
been allowed, by the "bursting bubble" mentality, to vanish
altogether from the case.
If it seems peculiar that because of an underlying sub-
stantive policy a presumption should be allowed to cast upon
one party or another the burden or persuasion, it seems so
only because we have lost sight of the reasons by which the
burdens of persuasion are allocated in the first instance. An
69. See note 21 supra, and accompanying text.
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Evidence and Civil Procedure teacher should at this point
feel a sense of embarrassment: The fact is that the real
reasons for allocating the burdens of persuasion are often un-
articulated, untaught, and forgotten. Truisms abound: The
party with the "affirmative" bears the burden of proof;
plaintiff must prove the "elements" of his claim, defendant
the "elements" of his defense. Both statements true, neither
helpful: The problem is to decide what is the "affirmative"
and why a particular "element" belongs in a claim rather
than a defense or vice versa. There are also some circular
rules of thumb: The McCormick text on Evidence-a fine,
penetrating work, worthy of its high reputation-states cor-
rectly enough that it is the pleadings which provide guidance
on the question of who bears the burden of persuasion;7" a
standard casebook in Civil Procedure states, also correctly,
the converse-that it is the allocation of the burden of per-
suasion which determines who must plead what. 1
Of course both the burden of persuasion and the burden
of pleading are actually allocated, as both McCormick and
the casebook authors were aware, not by a circular reference
to one another, but by considerations of substantive policy,
probability, relative accessibility of proof as between the
parties, and relative availability of proof-exactly the same
factors which underlie presumptions. 2 We may begin with
70. MCCORMICK, EVIDENCE § 337 (2d ed. 1972) ("In most cases, the party who
has the burden of pleading a fact will have the burdens of producing evi-
dence and of persuading the jury of its existence as well. The pleadings
therefore provide the common guide for apportioning burdens of proof.").
71. CoUND, FRIEDENTHAL & MILLER, CIVIL PROCEDURE, CASES AND MATERIALS
417 (2d ed. 1974) ("The burden of pleading an issue usually is assigned
to the party who has the burden of producing evidence on that issue at
trial.").
Compare 9 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2488 (3d ed. 1940) ("For one burden
(the risk of non-persuasion of the jury [as opposed to the burden of going
forward with evidence]) the substantive law and the pleadings, primarily,
serve to [allocate it among the parties], and, subsidiarily, a rule of prac-
tice, within the stage of a single pleading, may further apportion the
burden; but this apportionment depends ultimately on broad considerations
of policy, and for individual instances, there is nothing to do but ascertain
the rule, if any, that has been judicially determined for that particular class
of cases.").
72. Gausewitz, supra note 3, at 330; Cleary, supra note 1, at 21; JAMES, CIVIL
PROCEDURE § 7.9 (1965) ("What . . . are the bases upon which courts or
legislatures will create presumptions? For the most part they are the
same kinds of reasons that influence the allocation of the production burden
generally, and these may be summed up as reasons of convenience, fair-
ness, and policy.") [hereinafter cited as James].
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the idea that plaintiff bears most burdens because it is he
who would alter the status quo, and who seeks the aid of a
public authority to do so." A court should not interfere in
the lives of citizens unless there is good reason to do so, and
the party who seeks relief should bear the "risk or nonper-
suasion"-that is, of inaction by the court where the proof
on each side is of equal strength. We may add the thought
that most citizens pay just debts most of the time, and where
evidence to the contrary fails to convince, we should assume
that there is no just debt, and that due care was exercised,
for all of these propositions seem more probable than their
converse propositions."
Such general statements express substantive policy and
an assessment of probability; they provide rough and general
answers to the question of who should bear the burden of
persuasion. They indicate that in contract cases plaintiff
should prove the contract, the occurence of conditions pre-
cedent (including plaintiff's performance, in many in-
stances), defendant's breach, and the kind and amount of re-
sultant damages. They indicate that in negligence cases
plaintiff should prove defendant's negligence, proximate
cause, and the kind and amount of resultant damages."
More subtle questions remain. In a contract action,
does "nonpayment" amount to an element of plaintiff's claim,
or is "payment" an element of defendant's defense? In a
negligence case, should plaintiff's "due care" be an element
of the claim, or should the converse (contributory negligence)
be an element of the defense? We all know the answer to
these questions: Rules, books and decisions tell us. But
what is forgotten is that, in the contract case, we relieve
plaintiff of the burden of persuasion on the issue of payment
because defendant usually has better access to convincing
proof of payment, if payment has in fact been made (a re-
73. See, e.g., THAYER, PRELIMINARY TREATISE ON EvIDENcE AT THE COMMON
LAw 369, 376-77 (1898).
74. JAMES, supra note 72, § 7.8; Cleary, supra note 1, at 11-14.
75. JAMES, sUpra note 72, §§ 3.1 (elements of negligence claim) and 3.12 (ele-
ments of contract claim). And see 5 WRIGHT & MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE
AND PROCEDURE (Civil) §§ 1235 (contract claims) and 1249 (negligence
claims) (1969).
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ceipt, a cancelled check, voucher or withdrawal record). Ac-
cordingly, while plaintiff bears "most of the burdens," proof
of nonpayment is not among them. Could it also be that we
assume a different perspective on the underlying probabilities
in this instance? While most persons discharge their obliga-
tions, can we say with confidence that most of the defendants
sued for nonpayment have paid? 6
In negligence cases, while plaintiff bears "most of the
burdens," generally he need not prove his own due care, for
the burden is usually cast upon defendant to prove plaintiff's
contributory negligence. This allocation accords with the
balance of probabilities, if it be assumed that most persons
exercise due care most of the time. It serves a sound proced-
ural policy, in that (i) it satisfies a generally-held sense of
fairness, inasmuch as plaintiff's burden is heavy even with-
out requiring him to show due care, and (ii) it recognizes that
evidence of due care may be hard for plaintiff to come by,
either because the injured party is dead or, when plaintiff
seeks recovery for his own injuries, because accidents happen
quickly and unexpectedly, and plaintiff may know little of
what actually happened. Finally, it adds to the substantive
cast of the law (i.e., it expresses a substantive policy) by
lessening somewhat the chances that an injured party will
come away empty-handed." Of course departures from this
scheme are not unknown. It seems that jurisdictions which
require plaintiff to prove care are also expressing a substan-
tive view-one which emphasizes the notion that a person
should not profit from his own wrong, and one which is more
willing to allow injured parties to walk away without relief.
7 1
76. See Cleary, supra note 1, at 18.
77. See Green, Illinois Negligence Law II: Contributory Negligence, 39 ILL.
L. Rav. 116, 125-27 (1944); PROSSER, TORTS § 65 (4th ed. 1971); 2 HARPER
& JAMES, THE LAW OF TORTS § 22.11 (1956); and Palmer v. Hoffman, 318
U.S. 109, 117 (1943) (recognizing in Erie context that the matter of who
bears the burden of persuasion on issue of contributory negligence is a
a matter of substantive law).
78. It seems that Illinois still follows the anachronistic policy of requiring plain-
tiffs to plead and prove due care. See ILLINOIS PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS
§ 21.02 (1971); Green, supra note 77; and Turk, Comparative Negligence
on the March, 28 CHI.-KENT L. Ray. 189, 200 (1950) ("The situation [in
Illinois] is much the same as if, in every contract case, the plaintiff were
required to plead and prove his freedom from insanity.") And see Drier
v. McDermott, 157 Iowa 726, 141 N.W. 315, 316 (1913) (Holding that the
burden of proving due care rests upon plaintiff, and explaining the idea
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Presumptions represent attempts to implement, in the
context of particular issues rather than lawsuits, the same
reasoning and policies which lead to the allocation of the
burdens of persuasion. Sometimes for reasons of substantive
policy it is preferred that, when the basic fact is established,
the presumed fact be found. In other cases for reasons of
probability it is believed that, when the basic fact is estab-
lished, then the presumed fact probably exists. In still other
cases because the party on one side of a fact question has
better access to the evidence, when the basic fact is established
it is believed that the party with such better access should
establish the truth. Finally, in some cases because proof is
hard for all to come by, when the basic fact is shown it is pre-
ferred consistently to reach one result, rather than reaching
none at all or conflicting results.
Throughout this article most of the examples have in-
volved presumptions which express substantive policy-those
which relate to loaned automobiles, suicide or accident as the
cause of death, and the negligence of bailees. This selection
was by design, for in these cases a failure to carry forward
the policy of the law in jury instructions would be hardest to
fathom. Where the presumption arises because of underlying
probabilities alone-as is usually true in the case of the
mailed letter presumption-it seems doubtful that tradition-
alist theory can do much damage: If the basic fact has pro-
bative worth with respect to the presumed fact, the jury will
have sense enough to realize it, and give the basic fact the
weight it deserves. If the presumption exists because of
procedural policy alone-the relative accessibility of proof
to the parties, or the unavailability of any proof-it is dif-
ficult to assess the effect of traditionalist thinking. (In some
instances, however, the conclusion is inescapable that in fact
considerations of substantive policy also underlie the alloca-
of contributory negligence as a defense in these terms: "No party can com-
plain of the negligence of another where his own negligence is a concurring
cause in producing injuries. Where the negligence of both parties con-
tributes to the result, the courts will not hear the complaints of either. It
is said that this rule is based upon two considerations: (1) That no one
shall be permitted to take advantage of his own wrong. (2) Upon the
supposed inability of a court of law to apportion the damages occurring
[due] to the respective faults of the parties.").
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tion of the burden of persuasion in cases where proof seems
simply more accessible to one party than to another, or simply
unavailable to any party; and even where such substantive
considerations seem absent-e.g., the situation with respect
to proving payment as an affirmative defense in a contract
action-these procedural policy considerations have been
thought sufficient to affect the burden of persuasion.)
In any event, given a reasoned decision to keep a "one-
rule" approach to presumptions, by far the wiser approach
is the reformist approach of Uniform Rule 301. (The in-
structions which such an approach would generate are ex-
plored in Part IV, infra). Nothing less than the reformist
approach adequately deals with presumptions resting in
whole or in part upon considerations of substantive policy.
And, with respect to presumptions resting in whole or in part
upon considerations of procedural policy, this approach is at
least unlikely to give presumptions too great an effect, and the
same may be said of presumptions resting in whole or in part
upon logical considerations.
And what of the notion that the burden of persuasion
never "shifts"?" It seems that there are two underlying ideas
here, and these (both together and separately) are not enough
to justify the survival of the traditionalist approach to pre-
sumptions. First, it is thought that the expectations of the
parties should be protected, and that both plaintiffs and
defendants should know from the pleading stage forward who
bears the burden of persuasion on what issues. Second, it is
thought that jury instructions should be simple and straight-
forward, and that attaching conditions will unduly complicate
matters.
As to the first of these underlying reasons, there are
two good answers. In the first place, the pleadings are not
now invariably a reliable guide to who must prove what. In
contract cases, for instance, we require plaintiff to plead
'79. THAYER, PRELIMINARY TREATISE ON THE COMMON LAW OF EVIDENCE 378
(1898) ("[T]he burden of going forward with evidence may shift often
from side to side; while the duty of establishing his proposition is always
with the actor, and never shifts."); and 9 WIGMORE, EviDENCE § 2489 (3d
ed. 1940).
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nonpayment, but defendant bears the burden of proving non-
payment, and it is defendant who must plead the nonoccur-
rence of specific conditions, but plaintiff who must prove
the happening of these same conditions; in a libel case, it is
plaintiff who must plead untruth, but defendant who must
prove truth. There are good reasons for these discrepancies
between the burdens of pleading and proving, but the point
is that the pleadings do not now provide wholly reliable guid-
ance on the burden of persuasion which will operate in the
lawsuit. Moreover, it is doubtful that the traditionalist ap-
proach to presumptions affords to litigants any greater cer-
tainty upon the conduct and the realities of a trial than would
the reformist approach to presumptions, particularly inas-
much as the traditionalist approach means so many different
things.
In the second place, to draw upon the persuasive argu-
ment which Professor Cleary made some twenty years ago,n"
there is no good reason why the pleadings could not continue
to be as reliable as they have been on the question of which
party bears the burden of persuasion on what issues. For
example, both the burden of pleading and the burden of per-
suasion could be allocated in the following manner: In suits
to recover double indemnity or for accidential death, plaintiff
to plead and prove death by violence, defendant to plead and
prove suicide as the cause of death; in suits against the owner
of an automobile, plaintiff to plead and prove ownership (and
perhaps the employment of the driver, or his family relation-
ship to the owner), defendant to plead and prove lack of driv-
er's authority, or authority exceeded; in suits against a bailee
for damages to goods caused by negligence, bailor to plead
and prove bailment of sound goods and return of damaged
goods, bailee to plead and prove that the causes of damage
were beyond his control; and so on. Cleary suggested that
it is asking too much for presumptions to achieve these re-
forms: In his words, "Presumptions are a one-ton truck
carrying a ten-ton load."'
1
80. Cleary, supra note 1, at 21-23.
81. Cleary, supra note 1, at 22.
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But I would add-with apologies for the abrupt change
in metaphor-that it is the tail wagging the dog if we refuse
to make adjustments in the burden of persuasion because
that would undermine the pleading rules. Presumptions
are here to stay, and to deny to them the effect called
for by their underlying rationale because our pleadings fol-
low a different pattern is to be fooled by labels and truisms.
The other underlying reason-keeping jury instructions
simple-is unquestionably valid. But jury instructions are
necessarily fairly complicated, as is the substantive law they
reflect: Jurors seem to go about their tasks with open eyes
and good sense in part despite the instructions they receive,
and only in part because of them, even in states which (like
Wyoming) allow or require the written instructions them-
selves to be physically taken to the jury room. There is noth-
ing unusual about conditions-"if" clauses-in jury instruc-
tions, and since the very essence of our laws is expressed in
conditions,8" it is hard to imagine jury instructions taking
any other form."5 The only difference which reformist think-
ing would make in the complexity of jury instructions is
that, where the basic fact of the presumption is disputed,
the jury would be told that if it found the basic fact to be true,
then the party opposing the presumed fact bears the burden
of proving its nonexistence. Is this really so much more
complicated than what we now tell juries with respect to the
issues in the case in general? I doubt it. And who can say
that such an instruction would be more complicated than the
instructions which even the pristine version of the tradition-
alist theory requires? Those instructions are conditional too,
if the basic facts are disputed. Finally, can it not be said
that reformist thinking would actually simplify jury instruc-
tions over any of the variant modes which the tradition-
alist approach has spawned?
82. See note 15 supra.
83. Consider, for instance, the standard kind of res ipsa loquitur instruction,
in which the jury is instructed that if it finds cause, and if it finds that the
implement in question was under defendant's exclusive control, and if in
the ordinary course of events such an accident would not happen without
negligence, then it may find that the defendant was negligent. 2 DEVITT
& BLACKMAR, FEDERAL JURY INSTRUCTIONS (Civil) § 73.08 (1970). And
consider the last clear chance instruction. Id. at § 73.25.
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III. FEDERAL RULE 301,
ITS STATE COUNTERPARTS, AND UNIFORM RULE 301
A. Federal Rule 301
The manner in which the Federal Rules of Evidence
struggled into existence is a story in itself, but not for the
telling here. 4 Suffice it for our present purposes to note
the four following points:
First, the preparation of the Federal Rules of Evidence
spanned the decade from 1965 to 1975, and went forward
in two phases. From 1965 through late 1972, the project
was largely in the hands of an Advisory Committee, which
was expertly assisted in the enormous task of draftsmanship
by its Reporter, Professor Edward W. Cleary of Arizona
State University. This was the rulemaking phase. From
early 1973 through mid 1975, the project was in the hands
of Congress, which studied, amended, and ultimately enacted
a changed version of the Rules. This was the legislative
phase. 5
84. See note 85, infra.
85. Chief Justice Warren announced the appointment of the Advisory Commit-
tee on Rules of Evidence on March 8, 1965, see 1965 Jud. Conf. Ann. Rep.
19, and in June of that year the work of drafting the Rules began, with
Professor Cleary shouldering the actual task of putting the Rules down on
paper, see the letter from Albert E. Jenner, Esq., to the Honorable Albert
B. Maris, January 30, 1969, 46 F.R.D. 161, 173-81 (1969). Previously, a
Special Committee, with Professor Thomas F. Green of the University of
Georgia Law School as Reporter, had prepared a Preliminary Study which
had concluded that Federal Evidence Rules were "both feasible and desir-
able." 30 F.R.D. 73, 114 (1962). The Advisory Committee's final draft of
the Rules was transmitted to the Supreme Court in November, 1971, see
the testimony of Judge Maris, Hearings on H.R. 5463 Before the Senate
Comm. on the Judiciary, 93d Cong., 2d Sess., at 41 (1974), and one year
later, in November, 1972, the Supreme Court authorized the transmittal of
these Rules to the Congress, see 34 L.Ed. 2d ixv (1972). The Rules were
actually transmitted to Congress with the letter from Chief Justice Burger
to the Senate and House of Representatives, February 5, 1973, see H.R. Doc.
No. 93-46, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. iii (1973). The Rules were first taken up
by the House of Representatives, where they were assigned to the House
Special Subcommittee on the Reform of Criminal Laws, which held hear-
ings between February 7 and March 15, 1973. See Hearings on Proposed
Rules of Evidence Before the Special Subcomm. on Reform of Federal
Criminal Laws of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 93d Cong., 1st Sess.,
ser. 2 (with Supp.) (19-73). The House passed an amended version of the
Rules one year and one day after the Rules had arrived at that body. See
120 CONG. REC. 570 (daily ed. Feb. 6, 1974). The Senate received the Rules
on the next day, February 7, 1974, and retained them for more than nine
months. The Senate Judiciary Committee held hearings on the Rules in
June, 1974, see Hearings on H.R. 5463 Before the Senate Comm. on the
Judiciary, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. (1974). The Rules, again in amended form,
passed the Senate on November 22, 1974. 120 CONG. REC. 19908-19915
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Second, anybody observing from the sidelines the birth of
the Federal Rules could take comfort in the fact that one
principle remained constant throughout both the rulemaking
and the legislative phases. It was always clear that a dis-
tinctly federal rule on presumptions would be adopted only for
limited purposes. It was always believed that a distinctly
federal rule would not apply as to a presumption respecting
any fact amounting to "an element of a claim or defense as
to which state law supplies the rule of decision."" It was
assumed that in such cases the Erie doctrine would require
federal courts to apply state-created presumptions, and it
was always proposed that in such cases state law would
determine the "effect" of such presumptions. And when
would the federal treatment of presumptions prescribed in
the rule hold sway? In all other cases, unless some special
rule or Congressional enactment provided otherwise, which
meant basically that federal presumptions and the treatment
thereof prescribed in the rule would be applied with respect
to (i) any fact whose legal consequence would be determined
by federal law, and (ii) any fact amounting to something
less than "an element of a claim or defense" governed by
state law. What exactly is meant by the latter category is
itself something of a mystery, but it need not detain us here."7
Third, a sideline observer of the birth of the Federal
Rules might reasonably have thought, from about March,
1969 through October 10, 1973, that the federal treatment of
presumptions would follow the lines of reformist thinking.
During all this time an observer would have seen an evolving
set of federal rules which always described the up-and-coming
federal treatment for presumption in the following terms:
(daily ed. Nov. 22, 1974). In December, 1974, House/Senate Conferees met
to work out a compromise on the differences between the House and Senate
versions of the Rules. On December 16th, the Senate passed the compromise
version, see 120 CONG. REC. 21645 (daily ed. Dec. 16, 1974), and two days
later the House passed the same version, see 120 CONG. REC. 12259 (Dec.
18, 1974). The Rules were signed into law in January, as the Act of
January 2, 1975, Pub. L. No. 95-595, 88 Stat. 1926.
86. The quoted language is from Rule 302, and this language did not change
from the first published draft of the Rule, see 46 F.R.D. 161, 211 (1969),
to the time of final enactment by the Congress.
87. The matter is considered in 1 LouisELL & MuELER, FEDERAL EVrDENCE §§
74-77 (forthcoming).
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A presumption imposes on the party against whom
it directed the burden of proving that the nonexist-
ence of the presumed fact is more probable than its
existence.
The commitment of the Advisory Committee to the reformist
cause throughout the rulemaking phase was displayed in not
less than three published drafts of the rules. And in the first
of these drafts, in March, 1969, the Committee went so
far as to provide a detailed road map on the instructions
which a judge should give to a jury to implement the reform-
ist philosophy of the rule, indicating in clear language the
appropriate form of instructions, depending upon the condi-
tion of the evidence at the close of the proofs."8
Fourth, a sideline observer would see the first signs
of discord on the question of presumptions on October 10,
1973, when, well into the legislative phase, a House commit-
tee print of the Rules appeared."9 In this print, the Subcom-
mittee on Criminal Justice of the House Judiciary Commit-
tee proposed a compromise between traditionalist and re-
formist thinking, under which a presumption would affect
only "the burden of going forward with the evidence," but
would nevertheless be "sufficient proof of the fact presumed
to be considered by the trier of the facts." In effect, this
version of the Rule 301 converted the presumption into evi-
dence. A year later, on October 11, 1974, a sideline observer
would have seen a clear sign that the Senate would balk at
the presumption-as-evidence rule which the House had
88. See the Draft of March, 1969, 46 F.R.D. 161, 212 (1969) (wherein the
Rule is numbered 3-03, and wherein the "road map" on jury instructions
is set forth), the Draft of March, 1971, 51 F.R.D. 315, 336 (1971), and the
Court-promulgated Draft of November, 1972, 56 F.R.D. 183, 208 (1973)
(in which Rule 301 remains unchanged from the form in which the Ad-
visory Committee had transmitted the Rule to the Court).
89. The Committee Print of October 10, 1973 is set forth in full in Hearings
on Proposed Rules of Evidence Before the Special Subcomm. on Reform of
Federal Criminal Laws of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 93d Cong., 1st
Sess., ser. 2 (Supp.) at 357 (1973). A truly close watcher of Congress
might have seen the beginning of opposition to the Advisory Committee's
version of Rule 301 in the testimony of James F. Schaeffer, Esq., who
spoke on behalf of the Association of Trial Lawyers of America, and filed
a written statement with the House Subcommittee, both opposing the
reformist philosophy and supporting the traditionalist view. Id. at 295-296,
305-306.
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passed." What the Senate did, however, was not to return
to the reformist position taken by the Advisory Committee,
but instead to adopt the traditionalist position. The Senate
version prevailed, and Federal Rule 301 now provides:
In civil actions and proceedings not otherwise pro-
vided for by Act of Congress or by these rules, a pre-
sumption imposes on the party against whom it is
directed the burden of going forward with evidence
to meet or rebut the presumption, but does not shift
to such party the burden of proof in the sense of the
risk of nonpersuasion which remains throughout
the trial upon the party on whom it was originally
cast.
B. State Counterparts and Uniform Rule 301
At this writing in October, 1976, at least six states
had adopted their own versions of the Federal Rules of Evi-
dence, including Arkansas, Maine, Nebraska, Nevada, New
Mexico, and Wisconsin." The versions of Rule 301 in force
in these states differ considerably in detail, but they are as
one in adopting the reformist approach." In other words,
90. See S. REP. No. 93-1277, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 9-10 (1974).
91. See note 5 supra.
92. Perhaps the easiest way of demonstrating the point made in the text above
is to set forth here in full view the new Uniform Rule 301. Arkansas has
adopted this Rule verbatim, see ARK. STAT. ANN. § 28-1001 (Supp. 1976)
(ARKANSAS UNIFORM RULE 301). I have indicated in Italics the language
in new Uniform Rule 301 which is common to the language in the counter-
parts of the Rule now in effect in the states of Maine, Nebraska, Nevada,
New Mexico, and Wisconsin:
Rule 301. [Presumptions in General in Civil Actions and
Proceedings.]
(a) Effect. In all actions and proceedings not otherwise pro-
vided for by statute or by these rules, a presumption imposes on
the party against whom it is directed the burden of proving that
the nonexistence of the presumed fact is more probable than its
existence.
(b) Inconsistent Presumptions. If presumptions are inconsis-
tent, the presumption applies that is founded upon weightier con-
siderations of policy. If considerations of policy are of equal
weight neither presumption applies.
See HANDBOOK OF THE NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF COMMISSIONERS ON UNI-
FORM STATE LAWS 918 (1974) (wherein the bracketed title is also Italicized).
The Italicized words in the above-quoted passage are found in the MAINE
RULES OF EVIDENCE, Rule 301, set forth at the end of Title 14 (Court Proce-
dure-Civil) in ME. REv. STAT. ANN. (Supp. 1975) (the Maine version dif-
fers from the above-quoted Rule only in that Maine's version (i) expressly
includes statutory definitions of "prima facie evidence" within the ambit
of the term "presumption," and (ii) refers to "weighter considerations of
policy and logic" in its counterpart to subdivision (b) of the Uniform
Rule). The Italicized words in the above-quoted passage are also found in
NEB. REV. STAT. § 27-301 (Supp. 1975) (the Nebraska counterpart reads
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they are in accord with the view of the Advisory Committee
and at odds with the view of Congress, and they would seem
to insure for the moment a conflict between state and federal
practice.
The dates of adoption in three states-Nevada, New
Mexico, and Wisconsin-suggest the possibility (although I
have no inside information) that part of the motivation in
following the reformist view was to secure uniformity with
federal practice. The dates of adoption in Arkansas, Maine
and Nebraska, however, tend to foreclose such a possibility.3
in full exactly as the Uniform Rule 301(a) reads, except that Nebraska
uses the word "cases" instead of "actions and proceedings"). The Italicized
words in the above-quoted passage are also found in Nav. Ray. STAT.
§ 47.180(1) (1973) (the Nevada provisions on presumptions are far more
elaborate, however, including a road map on appropriate instructions which
is patterned after, though different in certain respects from, the original
proposal of the federal Advisory Committee, see note 114, infra). The
Italicized words in the above-quoted passage are also found in N.M. STAT.
ANN. § 20-4-301 (Supp. 1975) (like the Nebraska counterpart, the New
Mexico provision differs from the wording of Uniform Rule 301(a) only
insofar as New Mexico substitutes the word "cases" for the phrase "actions
and proceedings"). The Italicized words in the above-quoted passage also
appear in Wis. STAT. ANN. § 903.01 (1975) (but the Wisconsin provision
specifically refers to statutory and common law presumptions, including
"statutory provisions that certain basic facts are prima facie evidence of
other facts," and also makes clear that the party relying upon the presump-
tion bears the burden of persuading the trier of the existence of the basic
facts). The Italicized words in the above-quoted passage are also found
in all three of the Advisory Committee's versions of Federal Rule 301,
which in its entirety tracked Uniform Rule 301(a), except in referring to
"Acts of Congress" instead of "statute," and except in using the word
"cases" instead of "actions and proceedings." See the text following note
90 supra.
There are now decisions construing the above-noted provisions of
Nevada and Wisconsin law. See Privette v. Faulkner, 550 P.2d 404 (Nev.
1976) ; In re Estate of Malnar, 243 N.W.2d 435, 439-42 (Wis. 1976) (While
proponent of a will is entitled to benefit of presumption that decedent
knew the contents of a will, if it is shown that the will was duly executed,
and "the burden of persuasion shifts to the opponent to bring forth evi-
dence indicating that the nonexistence of the presumed fact (knowledge
of contents) is more probable than its existence," nevertheless the opponent
of the will is entitled to a presumption of undue influence upon showing
a confidential relationship between the principal beneficiary and the de-
cedent. At that point "the burden of persuasion shifted [back] to the pro-
ponent . . . to introduce sufficient evidence to rebut the presumption. [The
proponent] had the burden of proving that the nonexistence of the presumed
fact (undue influence) was more probable than its existence." [Court cites
Wis. STAT. ANN. § 903.01 (1975) which was in effect at the time of the
trial.]).
93. The dates of adoption in Nevada (1971, effective date July 21, 1971), New
Mexico (April 26, 1973, effective date July 1, 1973), and Wisconsin (1973,
effective January 1, 1974) all apparently preceded the earliest congres-
sional draft (that of October 10, 1973) which made alterations in the Rule
as promulgated by the Supreme Court, see note 89 supra. The dates of
adoption in Arkansas (1975, effective date July 1, 1976), Maine (May 13,
1975, effective date February 2, 1976) and Nebraska (1975, effective date
August 24, 1975) followed the date when the Congress first began to tinker
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In August, 1974, the National Conference of Commis-
sioners on Uniform State Laws adopted the new Uniform
Rules of Evidence, tracking closely the federal rules, except
in the areas of privileges and presumptions. The version of
Rule 301 endorsed by the Conference espouses the reformist
philosophy, and the Conference has apparently passed up for
at least one year the opportunity to conform its version of
Rule 301 to the one passed by the Congress."4
IV. INSTRUCTING JURIES ON PRESUMPTIONS95
A. Instructions Under Federal Rule 301
The enactment and the very terms of Federal Rule 301
with the Supreme Court's draft in earnest, although all three states actually
adopted the Rules before the Congress enacted the final federal version in
December, 1975. See note 85 supra.
94. See HANDBOOK OF THE NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF COMMISSIONERS ON UNI-
FORM STATE LAWS 144-45 (1974) (resolution of August 8, 1974, adopting
the new Uniform Rules), and HANDBOOK OF THE NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF
COMMISSIONERS ON UNIFORM STATE LAWS 93 (1975) (noting that the Spe-
cial Committee on Uniform Rules "advocates that certain amendments be
adopted by the Conference," and that the Committee "had recently met to
consider changes in the Uniform Rules which would conform them in some
respects to the Federal Rules") and 125 (noting that the Conference had
provided a proposal in the Uniform Rules governing evidentiary privileges,
since "Congress bypassed" this area). The Chairman of the Special Com-
mittee on Uniform Rules of Evidence, Frank F. Jestrab, Esq., advised the
author by telephone on October 9, 1976, that he was not aware of any rec-
ommendation or plan to amend Uniform Rule 301 so as to conform it to
Federal Rule 301.
95. It seems that nobody argues that a presumption may not generate an in-
struction to the jury when there is no counterproof tending to show the
nonexistence of the presumed fact. Even Thayer and Wigmore conceded
this much, see THAYER, A PRELIMINARY TREATISE ON EVIDENCE AT THE
COMMON LAw 336 (1898) (quoted in note 2 supra); and 9 WIGMORE, Evi-
DENCE § 2487 (3d ed. 1940). In such circumstances, the presumption gen-
erates either a simple direction to the jury to find the presumed fact or a
conditional direction to the jury, if the basic facts are in dispute. It seems
that nobody today would assert that the results would be any different
where the opponent of the presumed fact introduces counterproof insufficent
to support a finding of the nonexistence of the presumed fact. See also
note 39 supra. Accordingly, the instructions described in paragraphs 1 and
2 in the discussion of Federal Rule 301 "narrowly construed (Subpart
A(1) of this Part, infra) are elementary, noncontroversial, and would be
common to all rational approaches to presumptions, from the pristine
version of the traditionalist approach to the reformist approach.
The question has always been to define what, if anything, should be
said to the jury when sufficient counterproof has been introduced to sup-
port a finding of the nonexistence of the presumed fact. See generally
McCormick, Charges on Presumptions and Burden of Proof, 5 N.C.L. REV.
291 (1926) ; Morgan, Instructing the Jury Upon Presumptions and Burden
of Proof, 47 HARv. L. REv. 59 (1933). This question simply raises in a
new format the same question previously considered-that is, should the
traditionalist approach to presumptions be followed, or some variant mode
thereof, or the reformist approach?
One new question, peculiar to the context of jury instructions, is this:
Should the word "presumption" be used? I can see no resaon ever to use
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makes wholly clear the following points:" Presumptions
governed by the Rule (i) do affect the burden of production
but do not affect the burden of persuasion, (ii) are not evi-
dence, and should not be treated as evidence in instructions
to the jury," and (iii) operate separately and independently
from underlying inferences, and therefore the disappearance
of a presumption does not preclude the giving of an inference
instruction."
Whether the Rule mandates the pristine version of the
traditionalist approach, or some other, is not so clear. Under
the heading "Rule 301 Narrowly Construed," I explore the
meaning of this approach in the context of jury instructions.
Under the heading, "Rule 301 Broadly Construed," I explore
what I believe to be a preferable alternative.
the term, and much is to be said for avoiding it: The term means at once
too much and too little; it confuses lawyers, and can hardly help but confuse
laymen. See ALI MODEL CODE OF EVIDENCE 314 (1942); JEFFERSON, CALI-
FORNIA EVIDENCE BENCHBOOK §§ 46.3, 46.4 (1972). None of the instructions
explored in this Part would require actual use of the term "presumption"
in instructions to the jury.
96. Federal Rule 301 is set forth in full in the text accompanying note 90 supra.
97. In rejecting the language of the House-passed version of Rule 301, the
Senate Judiciary Committee expressly noted that under the House version
"presumptions are to be treated as evidence," and in its Report the Ju-
diciary Committee clearly indicated its intent to reject this approach
altogether:
The [Senate Judiciary] committee feels the House amendment is
ill-advised. As the joint committees (the Standing Committee on
Practice and Procedure of the Judicial Conference and the Advis-
ory Committee on the Rules of Evidence) stated: "Presumptions
are not evidence, but ways of dealing with evidence." This treat-
ment requires juries to perform the task of considering "as evi-
dence" facts upon which they have no direct evidence and which
may confuse them in performance of their duties. California had
a rule much like that contained in the House amendment. It was
sharply criticized by Justice Traynor in Speck v. Sarver and was
repealed after 93 troublesome years.
Professor McCormick gives a concise and compelling critique of
the presumption as evidence rule:
Another solution, formerly more popular than new, is to in-
struct the jury that the presumption is 'evidence', to be
weighed and considered with the testimony in the case. This
avoids the danger that the jury may infer that the presump-
tion is conclusive, but it probably means little to the jury, and
certainly runs counter to accepted theories of the nature of
evidence.
For these reasons the committee has deleted that provision of the
House-passed rule that treats presumptions as evidence.
S. RE. No. 93-127-7, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 9 (1974). The House/Senate
Conferees approved the version of Rule 301 which the Senate had passed,
making note of the difference between the House and Senate versions, but
not adding anything to the discussion of the "presumption-as-evidence"
approach, see H.R. REP. No. 93-1597, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 5-6 (1974), and
the Senate-passed version was ultimately enacted.
98. See the text accompanying note 99 infra.
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1. Rule 301 Narrowly Construed
Presumption Instructions. Regardless which alternative
is followed, a selection of the proper jury instruction turns
upon an appraisal of the condition of the evidence at the close
of the proofs with respect to (i) the existence or non-existence
of the basic fact underlying the presumption and (ii) the ex-
istence or nonexistence of the presumed fact. These two
factors may combine in any one of three ways which are con-
sequential from the standpoint of presumption instructions,
if Rule 301 be narrowly interpreted as adopting the tradition-
alist approach in its pristine form. It is convenient to con-
sider these three possibilities both generally and with refer-
ence to the short-form loaned automobile and long-form scope-
of-employment presumptions:
1. Basic Fact Established; Presumed Fact Uncontested
or Insufficiently Contested. If the basic fact is estab-
lished as a matter of law, and the party against whom
the presumption operates has introduced either no evi-
dence contradicting the presumed fact or insufficient
evidence to support a jury finding of its nonexistence,
then the jury should be instructed that it must find the
presumed fact:
Where it is established as a matter of law that 0 is
the owner of the automobile, and there is either no
evidence or insufficient evidence to support a jury
finding that D did not have O's permission to drive
the car or that he was not acting within the scope of
his agency on the occasion in question, the jury
should be instructed that it must find that D was
acting within the scope of his agency on that occa-
sion. (An instruction on the longer-form scope-
of-employment instruction would be similar.)
2. Sufficient Evidence of Basic Fact; Presumed Fact
Uncontested or Insufficiently Contested. If there is
sufficient evidence to support a finding of the basic
fact, but not so cogent and compelling as to require
such a finding, and the party against whom the pre-
sumption operates has introduced either no evidence
contradicting the presumed fact or insufficient evidence
to support a jury finding of its nonexistence, then a
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conditional instruction is called for. The jury should
be told that it must decide upon the evidence whether
the basic fact exists or not, and that if it finds the
existence of the basic fact, then it must find the presumed
facts:
With reference to the loaned automobile presump-
tion, where there is sufficient evidence upon which
to base a finding that 0 owned the automobile, and
there is either no evidence or insufficient evidence
to support a jury finding that D did not have per-
mission to drive it or was not acting within the
scope of his agency on the occasion in question, then
the jury should be instructed that the question of
ownership is for it to decide on the evidence, and
that if it finds that 0 owned the car, then it must
find that D was acting within the scope of his
agency on the occasion in question. (With ref-
erence to the longer-form scope-of-employment pre-
sumption, the instruction would be similar.)
3. Basic Fact Established or Supported by Sufficient
Evidence; Presumed Fact Contradicted by Sufficient
Evidence. If the party against whom the presumption
operates introduces evidence sufficient to support a
jury finding of the nonexistence of the presumed fact,
then the presumption is spent, and no presumption in-
struction, couched in mandatory terms, may be given.
This result obtains regardless of the strength of the evi-
dence underlying the basic fact (which may be conclu-
sively established by the evidence or by stipulation or
only supported by evidence sufficient to support a find-
ing of its existence), and regardless whether the judge
or the jury actually believes the evidence contradicting
the presumed fact. Thus, where the opponent of the
presumption introduces sufficient evidence to support a
finding that driver D did not have permission to drive
or was not acting within the scope of his agency on the
occasion in question, the jury must not be given the in-
struction set forth under (1) above even though the
evidence conclusively demonstrates that 0 owned the car,
and the jury must not be given the instruction set forth
under (2) above even though there is sufficient evi-
dence to support a jury finding that 0 owned the car.
Whether the jury should be instructed in permissive
terms that it may, but need not, find that D was acting
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within the scope of his agency on the occasion in question,
based upon evidence that 0 owned the car, is taken up
immediately below. (The same points are true with
respect to the longer-form scope-of-employment pre-
sumption.) By the narrow interpretation of Rule 301,
here explored, it would be improper to instruct the jury
that, by law, proof of the basic facts is strong evidence
of the presumed fact, that the jury should find the pre-
sumed fact unless upon all the evidence it believes that
its non-existence is at least as probable as its existence,
or in any way to urge upon the jury a finding of the pre-
sumed fact. This matter accounts for the principal dif-
ference between the narrow interpretation of Rule 301,
and the broader interpretation explained below in this
section.
Inference Instruction. As indicated above, where the
opponent of the presumption introduces sufficient evidence
as to the nonexistence of the presumed fact to support a jury
finding thereof, the presumption as such is spent under the
narrow construction of Rule 301, and a presumption instruc-
tion is improper. Even under this narrow construction, how-
ever, it does not follow that a permissive inference instruc-
tion is improper. In fact, the Report of the House/Senate
Conferees clearly suggests that in many such cases an in-
ference instruction would be entirely proper:
If the adverse party does offer evidence contra-
dicting the presumed fact, the court cannot instruct
the jury that it may presume the existence of the
presumed fact from proof of the basic facts. The
court may, however, instruct the jury that it may
infer the existence of the presumed fact from proof
of the basic facts."
Whether an inference instruction should in fact be given
in a particular case is a matter addressed neither by the Rule
on its face, nor in the legislative history, nor by the post-Rule
decisions to the time of this writing. In state courts, though
not in the federal system, the answer may turn upon the
condition of state law on the question of judicial comment
upon the evidence; there is considerable authority to the ef-
99. H.R. Ra'. No. 93-1597, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 5-6 (1974) (emphasis added).
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feet that specific instruction by the judge, which singles
out a particular fact or array of facts shown by the evi-
dence, and advises the jury that it may on the basis of such
fact or facts draw a particular inference, is in effect a com-
ment on the evidence, and therefore not allowed. °0 This
rule is not followed in federal courts, however, and in many
states it does not prevail. 1 ' (The question of a res ipsa
100. See Lappin v. Lucurell, 13 Wash. App. 277, 534 P.2d 1038, 1043 (1975)
("Inferences can get a party past a nonsuit, but ordinarily a jury should
not be instructed on them .... [W]hile trial courts have traditionally been
permitted in the proper case to instruct juries on established presumptions,
instructing on matters of inference treads dangerously close to commenting
on the facts and so invading the province of the jury." [citations omitted]) ;
Taylor v. Murphy, 6 Mich. App. 398, 149 N.W.2d 210, 213 (1967) ("It is
elementary that the judge may not instruct the jury what inferences of
fact to draw." [Instructions, examined "as a whole," were not erroneous]) ;
and Thiel v. Dove, 229 Ark. 601, 317 S.W.2d 121, 124 (1958) ("On the one
hand, it is permissible for the court to instruct the jury that a certain fact,
such as the possession of recently stolen goods, goes to the jury for its con-
sideration in connection with the other evidence as tending to show the
guilt of the accused .... On the other hand, it is clearly improper for the
court to tell the jury that a specific fact in evidence is sufficient to sup-
port an inference of guilt, negligence, or the like. [citations omitted] It is
for the jury to say whether the particular inference should be drawn from
all the proof in the case, and consequently the court comments on the
weight of the evidence when it declares that a certain inference may be
drawn from a specific fact."). But see JEFFERSON, CALIFORNIA EVIDENCE
BENCHBOOK § 46.3 at 806 (1972) ("[A] party may request an instruction
as to drawing inferences from the basic facts of a presumption [affecting
the burden of producing evidence, when the presumption has been dislodged
because the opponent has produced sufficient evidence of the nonexistence
of the presumed fact to support a jury finding thereof] . . . . Although
not required to comply with such a request, the trial judge may wish to
grant such a request. If so, the trial judge should tailor an instruction
to encompass the two points required for the res ipsa loquitur instruction."
[These are that the jury may, but is not required to, draw the inference,
and that the jury can only draw the inference if it believes, after weighing
all the evidence in the case, that it is more probable than not that the
fact to be inferred exists.]).
101. See CAL. CONST. art. VI, § 10 ("The court may make such comment on the
evidence and the testimony and credibility of any witness as in its opinion
is necessary for the proper determination of the case.") ; MICH. GEN. COURT
RULES OF 1963, Rule 516.1 (1976) ("The court may make such comments
on the evidence, the testimony, and the character of the witnesses as in
its discretion the interests of justice require."); and 9B MD. CODE ANN.,
Rule 554(b) (1971) ("In its instructions to the jury, which may be given
either orally or in writing or both, the court, in its discretion . . .May sum
up the evidence, if it instructs the jury that they are to determine for
themselves the weight of the evidence and the credit to be given to the
witnesses."). Compare New Mexico's Rule 51.1(4) N.M. STAT. (1953) ("It
shall no longer be proper practice for a trial judge in instructions to a
jury in a civil action or proceedings to hypothesize facts within the evidence
which if found by a jury to be true or untrue will justify or require a
verdict for or against a party. All rules of practice, whether by judicial
decision or otherwise, which permit or require the giving of such instruc-
tions are hereby revoked. Hereafter the trial judge shall merely instruct
the jury on the applicable rules of law and leave to counsel the application
of such rules to the facts according to their respective contentions. ...
(h) Comment on evidence. The judge, in so instructing the jury, may make
such fair comment on the evidence and the testimony and credibility of any
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loquitur instruction generally receives special treatment, and
is not generally subject to the bar noted here." 2)
There are two other factors to consider. The first is
the inherent probative value of the basic fact, if established
as a matter of law or supported by sufficient evidence to
justify a finding of its existence, plus any other evidence
so established or supported in the case, as proof of the pre-
sumed fact. If, without regard to the presumption (which
has vanished from the case in traditionalist "bursting bubble"
fashion), there is insufficient factual evidence in the case to
support a finding of the presumed fact, then an inference in-
struction is foreclosed. The other factor is the strength of
the adversary's evidence of the nonexistence of the presumed
fact. Obviously, if this evidence is not only sufficient to
allow, but also so cogent and compelling as to require, a
jury to find the nonexistence of the presumed fact, then a
permissive inference instruction would be foreclosed.
Assuming that a permissive inference instruction is
proper, then the form of the instruction will turn upon the
condition of the evidence of the underlying facts (including
witness as in his opinion is necessary for the proper determination of the
case; but if such comment is made, the judge shall inform the jury that
they are the sole judges of all questions of fact.").
102. See North Central Gas Co. v. Bloem, 376 P.2d 382, 384 (Wyo. 1962)
("[T]here was substantial evidence presented which fully warranted the
trial court in instructing upon the doctrine [of res ipsa loquitur] and sub-
mitting the matter to the jury for final determination on the subject.").
See also CAL EVID. CODE § 646 (West Supp. 1976) (The statute provides,
in subsection (c): "If the evidence, or facts otherwise established, would
support a res ipsa loquitur presumption and the defendant has introduced
evidence which would support a finding that he was not negligent or that
any negligence on his part was not a proximate cause of the occurrence, the
court may, and upon request shall, instruct the jury [that it may infer that
the proximate cause of the occurrence was defendant's negligence, but that
it shall not so find unless it believes this to be more probable than not]").
And Bee 2 HARPER & JAMES, THE LAW OF TORTS § 19.11 (1956) ("The jury
should be told (on the issue of negligence) that plaintiff can recover only
if they find that defendant was more probably negligent than not; that in
the case at bar the circumstances of the accident afford a basis for an in-
ference, which they may but need not draw, that defendant was negligent;
and that in determining this matter they should consider the explanation
and rebuttal (if any) offered by defendant."); 2 DEVITT & BLACKMAR,
FEDERAL JURY PRACTICE AND INSTRUCTIONS (Civil) § 78.02 (1970).
But see Zukowsky v. Brown, 79 Wash. 2d 586, 488 P.2d 269, 279 (1971)
("Res ipsa is properly treated the same as other circumstantial evidence
in instructions to the jury. The remaining question is whether, instead
of or in addition to these instructions, the so-called 'res ipsa instruction'
should be given. We are aware of the opinion that such instructions should
not be given. To do so is to emphasize one particular inference over
others. . .).
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the basic fact of the vanished presumption), and the in-
struction will bear some resemblance to the presumption in-
structions set forth in paragraphs I and 2, above. Looking
at the scope-of-employment presumption, and assuming (i)
that the basic fact of the presumption (that M owned the
car and employed S to drive it) constitutes a sufficient basis
to find that S was acting within the scope of his employment
in driving the car on the occasion in question, and (ii) that
there was sufficient evidence that S was not acting within
the scope of his employment to permit a jury so to find,
but not enough evidence to require a such finding as a matter
of law, then the inference instruction would take either of the
following forms:
1. Underlying Facts Established. Where the facts that
M owned the car and employed S to drive it are conclu-
sively established, the jury may be instructed that it
must decide on the evidence whether S was acting within
the scope of his employment, and that it may but need
not conclude that he was so acting on the basis of the
facts that M owned the car and employed S to drive it.
2. Sufficient Evidence of Underlying Facts. Where there
is sufficient evidence upon which to base a finding that
M owned the automobile and employed S to drive it, then
the jury may be instructed that it must decide on the
evidence whether S was acting within the scope of his
employment, and that if the jury finds that M owned
the car and employed S to drive it, then it may but
need not find on that ground that S was acting within
the scope of his employment on the occasion in question.
Whether either of these instructions will be given de-
pends further, of course, upon whether an instruction is
properly requested.' It seems that the matter is well within
the discretion of the trial judge, and seldom will a refusal
103. See FED. R. Civ. P. and Wyo. R. Civ. P. 51 ("At the close of the evidence,
or at such earlier time during the trial as the court reasonably directs,
any party may file written requests that the court instruct the jury on
the law as set forth in the requests .... No party may assign as error the
giving or the failure to give an instruction unless he objects thereto before
the jury retires to consider its verdict, stating distinctly the matter to which
he objects and the grounds of his objection.").
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to give an inference instruction, even when properly re-
quested, be reversible error.
2. Broader Interpretation of Federal Rule 301
The vice in the narrow construction of Rule 301 is that
it would enfeeble any presumption whenever the opponent in-
troduced evidence sufficient to support a jury finding of the
nonexistence of the presumed fact. In any such case the
narrow reading would allow at best the inference instruction
considered above, which carries forward nothing of the force
in logic or policy which called the presumption into being in
the first place-and even the inference instruction would be
allowed only where the judge thought it clear, without any
reference to the presumption, that the underlying facts were
alone sufficient to support a jury finding of the presumed
fact. The narrow construction would, in short, pose an
"either/or" dilemma: Either the presumption controls the
jury's deliberations with respect to the presumed fact, or it
has no affirmative influence at all.
Preferable to the narrow reading of Rule 301, at least
so long as it remains true that presumptions cannot affect
the burden of persuasion, would be a middle ground position
possible under a broader reading of Rule 301. From the
congressional rejection of the presumption-as-evidence ap-
proach, it seems doubtful that even a state-adopted version
of Federal Rule 301 could be read as allowing such an ap-
proach, unless there were a specific contrary indication in
accompanying legislative or judicial Comments. The other
three variant modes of the traditionalist approach, previous-
ly explored, might be considered still available. The only one
of these which seems relatively problem-free is the "equi-
poise" approach adopted in Maine.
The "equipoise" approach would generate instructions
in the following forms: Where the presumption rests mostly
or entirely upon substantive or procedural policy grounds,' 0'
104. For presumptions based mostly or entirely upon grounds of substantive
or procedural policy, slightly different phraseology is suggested from that
for presumptions based mostly or entirely upon grounds of logic or
probability.
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the jury should be told that upon finding the basic fact it
should also find the presumed fact unless upon all the evidence
in the case it finds that the nonexistence of the presumed
fact is at least as probable as its existence. Where the pre-
sumption rests mostly or entirely upon inherent logic or prob-
ability the jury should be told that the basic fact is strong
evidence of the presumed fact, and that upon finding the basic
fact it should therefore find the presumed fact to exist unless
upon all the evidence it believes that the nonexistence of the
presumed fact is at least as probable as its existence."' Such
instructions do not equate the presumption with evidence;
they do not run afoul of the express bar in Rule 301 against
imposing upon the party against whom the presumption
operates "the burden of proof in the sense of the risk of non-
persuasion....
The reason for the distinction is to increase candor with the jury, by
avoiding any suggestion that the basic facts are evidence in the former
case, while emphasizing that same suggestion in the latter case. Little else
turns upon this distinction. Both forms of instruction serve the fundamen-
tal purpose of imparting to the jury the idea that the basic fact should
have special weight as a basis for finding the presumed fact. Little dam-
age could be done in choosing either phraseology if the presumption in
question does not easily fit either of the suggested molds of if an error
were made in choosing one form of language rather than the other.
105. Professor Morgan, who did not distinguish between presumptions based
upon logic or probability and presumptions based upon substantive or pro-
cedural policy, at least in the context of the wording of jury instructions,
suggested the following language: "'Since [basic fact] A is established,
you must begin with the assumption that [presumed fact] B exists. But
that assumption may be destroyed by evidence. If from all the evidence
you find either that the non-existence of B is more probable than its exis-
tence or that the non-existence of B is as probable as its existence, you
will then find that B does not exist, otherwise you will find that B does
exist.'" Morgan commented: "This clearly places upon the party against
whom the presumption operates the burden of putting the jury in such a
state of mind that each juryman is unable to determine the truth or falsity
of the proposition, that the existence of B is more probable than its non-
existence." Morgan, Instructing the Jury Upon Presumptions and Burden
of Proof, 47 HARv. L. REv. 59, 70 (1933). See also id. at 75-76.
106. By the approach recommended here, if plaintiff P bears the burden of
persuasion on the question whether driver D had owner O's permission to
drive O's car, and was acting within the scope of the agency thus estab-
lished, P will still have that burden or persuasion even if he proves the
basic fact of the loaned automobile presumption-that 0 owned the car.
That is, if the presumption is given the effect recommended here, the jury
must find against P on the agency issue if the evidence that D did not have
O's permission or was acting beyond its scope is so strong as to leave the
mind of the jury in equilibrium so that it simply cannot decide the question.
This is entirely consistent with Rule 301's directive that the presumption
does not affect the burden of persuasion.
If the presumption operates in favor of the party who bears the burden
of persuasion on the issue of the existence of the presumed fact, then the
approach taken under the broader construction of Rule 301 achieves the
aim of giving to presumptions greater effect without at the same time
shifting the burden of persuasion to the opponent of the presumption. If
the presumption operates in favor of the party who does not bear the risk
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Such instructions do carry forward a sense of the
strength in policy or logic which called the presumption into
existence in the first place. Finally, such instructions could
be given without the need to determine whether the facts
(including the basic fact) are sufficient evidence of the ex-
istence of the presumed fact to support a jury finding there-
of: The approach here taken assumes a continuing presence
of the presumption in the case, and there is no occasion to
question the strength of the basic fact as a basis to find
the presumed fact without reference to the presumption as
would be necessary with the inference instruction; the pre-
sumption itself provides an affirmative answer to that ques-
tion.
The form of instructions to the jury, under the broader
interpretation of Rule 301, is determined, as before, by the
condition of the evidence at the close of the proofs with re-
spect to (i) the existence or nonexistence of the basic fact
underlying the presumption, and (ii) the existence or non-
existence of the presumed fact. Under this broader construc-
tion, there are five possibilities to consider:
1. Basic Fact Established; Presumed Fact Uncontested
or Insufficiently Contested. The form of instruction is
exactly the same as the one set forth in paragraph 1,
under the heading "Rule 301 Narrowly Construed." In
this situation, it makes no difference whether the Rule be
narrowly or more broadly construed.
2. Sufficient Evidence of Basic Fact; Presumed Fact
Uncontested or Insufficiently Contested. The instruc-
of non-persuasion, and therefore against the party who already bears the
burden of proof on the issue of the presumed fact, then the party in whose
favor the presumption operates is already entitled to an instruction which
gives him more than any presumption instruction under Rule 301 could
give him. That is, the instructions on burden of proof which the judge
would give without reference to any presumption will emphasize that the
party against whom the presumption operates--the one who has the burden
of persuasion-must show by a preponderance of the evidence the evidence
the existence (or, more likely, the nonexistence) of the presumed fact, which
imposes upon him a greater burden than any presumption instruction under
Rule 301 could impose. However, an inference instruction may still be
useful in these circumstances, and would be entirely proper.
And see generally Morgan, Instructing the Jury Upon Presumptiona
and Burden of Proof, 47 HAJv. L. REv. 59, 70 (1933); Morgan, Presump-
tions, 12 WASH. L. REV. 255, 272-274, (1937); and the discussion in note
68 supra,
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tion is exactly the same as the one set forth in paragraph
2, under the heading "Rule 301 Narrowly Construed." In
this circumstance it once again makes no difference
whether the Rule be narrowly or more broadly con-
strued.
3. Basic Fact Established; Sufficient Evidence of Non-
existence of Presumed Fact To Support a Jury Finding
Thereof, but Not to Require Such a Finding. Here it
makes a difference whether Rule 301 is construed nar-
rowly or more broadly, for under the narrow construc-
tion there would be no presumption instruction, as in
paragraph 3 under the "narrow construction" heading.
Under the broader interpretation of Rule 301, there
should still be a presumption instruction when the pre-
sumption in question operates in favor of the party who
bears the burden of persuasion on the issue of the pre-
sumed fact, as it ordinarily does in the case of the loaned
automobile and scope-of-employment presumptions. If
the basic fact is established as a matter of law, and the
party against whom the presumption operates has in-
troduced evidence which is sufficient to support a jury
finding of the nonexistence of the presumed fact, but
not so cogent as to require that the jury be directed to
find its nonexistence, then the jury should be instructed
either (a) that it should find the existence of the pre-
sumed fact unless it finds on the basis of all the evidence
in the case that the nonexistence of that fact is at least
as probable as its existence (this form being designed for
presumptions which rest mostly or entirely upon the
ground of public policy), or (b) that the basic fact is
strong evidence of the presumed fact, so that the jury
should find the presumed fact to exist unless upon all the
evidence it believes that the nonexistence of that fact is
at least as probable as its existence (this form being
designed for presumptions which rest mostly upon logic
or probability):
With respect to the loaned automobile presumption,
which appears to rest mainly upon policy, the jury
should be told that it should find that D was acting
within the scope of his agency on the occasion in
question unless the jury finds on the basis of all
the evidence that it is at least as probable that D
was not acting within the scope of his agency as it
is that he was so acting. With respect to the longer-
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form scope - of - employment presumption, which
seems to rest heavily upon probability, the jury
should be told that the fact of M's ownership of the
car and his employment of S to drive the car is
strong evidence that S was acting within the scope
of his employment on the occasion in question, and
that the jury should so find unless on the basis of
all the evidence in the case the jury finds that it is
at least as probable that D was not acting within
the scope of his employment as it is that he was so
acting.
4. Sufficient Evidence of Basic Fact; Sufficient Evi-
dence of Nonexistence of Presumed Fact to Support a
Jury Finding Thereof, but Not to Require Such a
Finding. Here again it makes a difference whether Rule
301 be construed narrowly or broadly, for under the
narrow construction there would once again be no pre-
sumption instruction, as in paragraph 3 under the "nar-
row construction" heading, above. Under the broader
interpretation, there should still be a presumption in-
struction when the presumption in question operates in
favor of the party who bears the burden of persuasion
on the issue of the presumed fact, as it ordinarily does
in the case of the loaned automobile and scope-of-employ-
ment presumptions. If there is sufficient evidence to
support a finding of the basic fact, and the party against
whom the presumption operates has introduced evidence
which is sufficient to support a jury finding of the non-
existence of the presumed fact, but not so cogent as to
require that the jury be directed to find its nonexistence,
then the jury should be instructed either (a) that if it
finds the existence of the basic fact., then it should also
find the existence of the presumed fact, unless it finds
on the basis of all the evidence in the case that the non-
existence of the latter fact is at least as probable as its
existence (this form being designed for Dresumptions
which rest mostly or entirely upon the ground of public
policy), Qr (b) that if it finds the existence of the basic
fact, then it should consider that fact to be strong evi-
dence of the presumed fact, and it should find the pre-
sumed fact to exist unless upon all the evidence it believes
that the nonexistence of the latter fact is at least as
probable as its existence (this form being designed for
presumptions which rest mostly or entirely upon logic
or Drobability) :
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With reference to the loaned automobile presump-
tion, which appears to rest mainly upon policy, the
jury should be told that if it finds that 0 owned
the car, then it should find that D was acting within
the scope of his agency unless on the basis of all
evidence it believes that it is at least as probable
that D was not acting within the scope of his agency
as it is that he was so acting. With reference to the
longer-form scope-of-employment presumption, the
jury should be told that if it finds that M owned
the car and employed S to drive it, then it should
consider those facts to be strong evidence that S
was acting within the scope of his employment on
the occasion in question, and that it should so find
unless on the basis of all the evidence the jury finds
that it is at least as probable that S was not acting
within the scope of his employment as it is that S
was so acting.
5. Nonexistence of the Presumed Fact Conclusively
Established. Where the party against whom the pre-
sumption operates introduces evidence of the nonex-
istence of the presumed fact which is so cogent as to
require a finding of its nonexistence as a matter of law,
the presumption is entirely dislodged. There should
be no instruction on the presumption, and the jury should
be told to find the nonexistence of the presumed fact.
3. Which Construction Is Correct?
The narrow construction of Rule 301, adopting the
traditionalist approach in its pristine form, is supported by
the following: First, when the Senate Judiciary Committee
first proposed the language which the Congress ultimately
enacted and which is found in the present version of Rule
301, Professor Cleary made known his views as to the mean-
ing of that language. In concise and definite terms, he
(quite reasonably) asserted that Rule 301 in that form
"adopts a straight bursting bubble rule" under which "the
presumption vanishes as a presumption upon the introduction
of evidence sufficient to support a finding of the nonexistence
of the presumed fact even though not a single person in the
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court room actually believes it."' 7 Faced with this construc-
tion of the Rule under consideration, the House/Senate Con-
ference nonetheless made no change, and the Congress en-
acted Rule 301 in the form to which Professor Cleary re-
ferred.
Second, the Report of the House/Senate Conference
may well be read as indicating an intent to disallow a pre-
sumption instruction where the opponent of the presumption
has introduced evidence sufficient to support a jury finding
of the nonexistence of the presumed fact. That Report
states in pertinent part:
[A] presumption is sufficient to get a party past
an adverse party's motion to dismiss made at the
end of his case-in-chief. If the adverse party of-
fers no evidence contradicting the presumed fact, the
court will instruct the jury that if it finds the basic
facts it may presume the existence of the presumed
fact. If the adverse party does offer evidence con-
tradicting the presumed fact, the court cannot in-
struct the jury that it may presume the existence of
presumed fact from proof of the basic facts. The
court may, however, instruct the jury that it may
infer the existence of the presumed fact from proof
of the basic facts."8
The last two sentences in the quoted passage may well mean
that the Conference intended to disapprove a presumption
instruction where the opponent introduces evidence sufficient
to find the nonexistence of the presumed fact, and to allow
only a permissible inference instruction, phrased in terms of
"may infer," "may find," or the like.
The broader construction of Rule 301 is also support-
able, however. First, it should not be overlooked that the
107. Memorandum of October 31, 1974, prepared by Professor Cleary on behalf
of the Advisory Committee on Rules of Evidence and the Committee on
Rules of Practice and Procedure, commenting upon the Senate changes in
House-passed version of Rule 301 at 1-5.
And see Usery v. Turner Elkhorn Mining Co., ___ U.S. , 96 S. Ct.
2882, 2898 (1976) (Citing FED. R. EVID. 301 in conjunction with a discussion
of presumptions created by federal regulations promulgated pursuant to fed-
deral statute, the Court noted: "Each presumption is explicitly rebuttable,
and the effect of each is simply to shift the burden of going forward with
evidence from the claimant to the operator.").
108. H.R. REP. No. 93-1597, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 5-6 (1974).
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above-quoted language is badly confused about the nature of
the problem. It is doubtful that a federal judge would or
should instruct a jury that it "may presume" the existence
of the presumed fact if it finds the basic facts where there is
no evidence contradicting the presumed fact. The language
in the Report confuses the presumption instruction with the
inference instruction. It is reasonable to discount, at least
in some degree, a Report which misapprehends the very
issue to which it is addressed. (The Report would make
better sense if the phrase "must find," or its equivalent, were
substituted for the phrase "may presume" in both the sec-
ond and third of the above-quoted sentences.)
Second, a careful reading of the language indicates that
the Report neither prohibits the kind of instruction suggested
under the "broader construction" heading, nor mandates the
kind of instruction which the "narrow construction" would
require. Closely read, the Report disapproves giving to the
jury the very same instruction, where there is evidence suf-
ficient to support a finding of the nonexistence of the pre-
sumed fact, that the judge would give where there is no such
evidence. I agree with that proposition. While the judge
should instruct the jury that it "must find" the existence of
the presumed fact if it believes the basic fact and there is no
evidence contradicting the presumed fact, certainly the judge
should not give that same instruction where there is sufficient
evidence to support a finding of the nonexistence of the pre-
sumed fact. Nothing in the "broader construction" described
above implies otherwise.
Third, the "broader construction" of Rule 301 represents
a sounder approach, for it recognizes the underlying logic
and policies as the narrow construction does not. It is there-
fore more consistent than the "narrow construction" with
the mandate of Federal Rule 102, which directs that the
Rules "be construed to secure .. promotion of growth and
development of the law of evidence to the end that the truth
may be ascertained and proceedings justly determined.""1 9
109. See FED. R. Evm. 102.
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B. INSTRUCTIONS UNDER STATE COUNTERPARTS
AND UNIFORM RULE 301
The reformist view of presumptions generates a set of
instructions to the jury which are both simple and, in general,
couched in the familiar terminology by which the burden
of proof is explained to the jury. As is true under both in-
terpretations of Federal Rule 301 explored in Part V of this
article, the proper form of instructions to the jury pursuant
to Uniform Rule 301 and state-adopted counterparts to the
Federal Rules turns upon the condition of the evidence at
the close of the proofs with respect to (i) the basic fact and
(ii) the presumed fact. There are four significant combina-
tions:
1. Basic Fact Established; Presumed Fact Uncontested
or Insufficiently Contested.11 Again, the instruction
will be identical to the one set forth in paragraph 1 in
the discussion of the narrow construction of Federal
Rule 301, supra. If the basic fact is established as a
matter of law, and the party against whom the presump-
tion operates has introduced either no evidence contra-
dicting the presumed fact or insufficient evidence to sup-
port a jury finding of its nonexistence, then the jury
should be instructed that it must find the presumed
fact. In this situation, it makes no difference whether
the traditionalist theory (in whatever form) or the re-
formist theory applies.
2. Sufficient Evidence of the Basic Fact; Presumed
Fact Uncontested or Insufficiently Contested."' Yet
110. The form of instruction suggested here corresponds to that recommended
by the Advisory Committee in the March, 1969 Draft of Federal Rule 3-03
(c) (1) (A) and 3-03(c) (2) (B), see 46 F.R.D. 161, 212-213 (1969). It also
corresponds to the form of instruction suggested by NEV. REV. STAT.
§§ 47.190(1) and 47.200(2) (1973). See also JEFFERSON, CALIFORNIA Evi-
DENCE BENCHBOOK § 46.6 (1972) (author's black letter rule (a)).
111. The form of instruction suggested here is similar to that suggested by the
Advisory Committee in the March, 1969 Draft of Federal Rule 3-03(c) (1)
(C), see 46 F.R.D. 161, 212 (1969), and to that suggested by Nm'. REV.
STAT. § 47.190(3) (1973). See also JEFFERSON, CALIFORNIA EVIDENCE
BENCHBOOK § 46.4 (1972) (author's black letter rule (b)). However, none
of these sources makes note of the fact that the burden of persuasion on
the issue of the existence of the basic fact rests upon the party in whose
favor the presumption operates. See WIs. STAT. ANN. § 903.01 (1975),
expressly noting that "the party relying on the presumption" bears "the
burden of proving the basic facts . . . ." While I doubt the wisdom of
complicating the instructions to the jury in this way if the presumption
is to have only the effect which the traditionalist theory would allow,
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again, the instruction is identical to the one previously
explored for this situation in paragraph 2 of the discus-
son of the narrow construction of Federal Rule 301,
supra. If there is sufficient evidence to support a find-
ing of the basic fact, but not such cogent and compell-
ing evidence as would require such a finding, and the
party against whom the presumption operates has in-
troduced either no evidence contradicting the presumed
fact or insufficient evidence to support a jury finding
of its nonexistence, then a conditional instruction is
called for. The jury should be told that it must decide
upon the evidence whether the basic fact exists or not,
and that if it finds the existence of the basic fact, then
it must find the existence of the presumed fact.
3. Basic Fact Established; Sufficient Evidence of the
Nonexistence of Presumed Fact to Support a Jury Find-
ing Thereof, But Not to Require Such a Finding."2 Here
it makes a difference whether a court is applying Fed-
eral Rule 301 (regardless whether that Rule be broadly
or narrowly construed) or Uniform Rule 301. Under
Uniform Rule 301, the trial judge should instruct the
jury that the party against whom the presumption oper-
ates bears the burden of persuasion on the question of
the existence of the presumed fact, and therefore that
if the jury finds that said party has not shown by a pre-
ponderance of the evidence that the presumed fact does
not exist, the jury should find that the presumed fact
does exist:
With respect to the short-form loaned automobile
presumption, the jury should be told that the burden
it might be wise to convey this information to the jury if the presumption
is to shift the burden of persuasion, as it does under Uniform Rule 301. I
have not added language to achieve this end in paragraph 2 above, but it
has been added in paragraph 4-and these are the only two situations where
such language would be appropriate.
112. The form of instruction suggested here is similar to that suggested by the
Advisory Committee in its March, 1969 Draft of Federal Rule 3-03(c) (2)
(C), see 46 F.R.D. 161, 213 (1969), and to that suggested by NEV. REV.
STAT. 47.200(3) (1973). See also JEFFERSON, CALIFORNIA EVIDENCE BENCH-
BOOK § 46.4 (1972) (author's black letter rule (c)). However, the cast of
the wording suggested in these sources tends somewhat more to favor a
finding of the presumed fact than does the wording I suggest here. These
sources seem to imply an instruction in this form: "0 bears the burden of
persuasion on the question whether D was O's agent acting within the
scope of his authority, and you should so find, unless you find from all
the evidence in the case that it is more probable than not that D was not
O's agent, in which event you should find that D was not O's agent, or
unless you find from all the evidence in the case that it is more probable
than not that D exceeded his authority, in which event you should find
that he exceeded his authority."
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of persuasion on the question whether D was O's
agent acting within the scope of his agency rests
upon 0, and that if the jury finds that 0 has not
shown by a preponderance of the evidence that D
was not O's agent or that 0 has not shown that D
exceeded the scope of his agency, then the jury
should find that D was O's agent acting within the
scope of his agency.
4. Sufficient Evidence of Basic Fact; Sufficient Evi-
dence of Nonexistence of Presumed Fact to Support a
Jury Finding Thereof, But Not to Require Such a Find-
ing.1  Here again it makes a difference whether a court
is applying Federal Rule 301 (regardless whether that
Rule be broadly or narrowly construed) or Uniform
Rule 301. Under Uniform Rule 301, the trial judge
should give a conditional instruction. He should instruct
the jury that the party for whom the presumption oper-
ates bears the burden of persuasion on the question of
the existence of the basic fact, and that if the jury finds
that said party has not shown by a preponderance of
the evidence that the basic fact exists, then the jury
should find that the basic fact does not exist. (In many
instances, it will be appropriate to instruct the jury at
this point that if it finds that the basic fact does not
exist, it should return a verdict in favor of the party op-
posing the presumption.) However, the jury should
also be instructed that if it finds that the basic fact
does exist, then the party against whom the presumption
operates bears the burden of persuasion on the question
of the existence of the presumed fact, and therefore
that if the jury finds that said party has not shown by
a preponderance of the evidence that the presumed fact
113. The form of instruction suggested here is similar to that suggested by the
Advisory Committee in its March, 1969 Draft of Federal Rule 3-03(c) (3),
see 46 F.R.D. 161, 214 (1969), and to that suggested by NEV. REV. STAT.
§ 47.220 (3) (1973). See also JEFFERSON. CALIFORNIA EVIDENCE BENCHBOOK
§ 46.4 (1972) (author's black letter rule (d)). Once again, however, none
of these sources makes note of the fact that the burden of persuasion on
the issue of the existence of the basic fact rests upon the party in whose
favor the presumption operates. See Wis. STAT. ANN. § 903.01 (1975),
quoted in note 111 supra. And again, though I doubt the wisdom of com-
plicating matters by mentioning this burden to the jury if the presumption
is to have only the effect which the traditionalist theory in its various
forms would allow, it might be wise to convey this information to the jury
if the presumption shifts the burden of persuasion. Language designed to
achieve this end is added in paragraph 4 above. It could also be added in
paragraph 2, see note 111 supra. And once again, the cast of the wording
suggested in these sources seems somewhat more to favor a finding of the
presumed fact than does the wording I suggest here. See note 112 supra.
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does not exist, the jury should find that the presumed
fact exists:
With respect to the short-form loaned automobile
presumption, the jury should be told that the plain-
tiff bears the burden of persuasion on the question
whether 0 owns the automobile in question and that
if plaintiff has not shown by a preponderance of the
evidence that 0 owned the automobile, then the jury
should find that 0 did not own it. (In this instance,
it will probably be appropriate to instruct the jury
that if it finds that 0 did not own the automobile,
then the jury should return a verdict in O's favor,
although there could conceivably be cases in which 0
could be liable for D's negligence even if 0 did not
own the car, in which case such an instruction
should not be given.) The jury should also be in-
structed that if it finds that 0 owned the automo-
bile, then 0 bears the burden of persuasion on the
question whether D was O's agent acting within the
scope of his agency, and that if the jury finds that
O has not shown by a preponderance of the evidence
that D was not O's agent or that 0 has not shown
that D exceeded the scope of his agency, then the
jury should find that D was O's agent acting within
the scope of his agency.
It seems appropriate to emphasize here that nothing
in the reformist approach to presumption embodied in Uni-
form Rule 301 implies that the court can never take the is-
sue of the presumed fact from the jury by directing the
jury to find the nonexistence of the fact, which may as a
practical matter mean a directed verdict in favor of the
party against whom the presumption operates. Just as it
is possible to direct a verdict in favor of plaintiffs as well
as against them, so it is possible to direct the jury to find
the nonexistence of the presumed fact as well as its existence.
In other words, nothing in the reformist view or in Uniform
Rule 301 implies that a presumption is in any way conclusive.
The road map which is contained in the Advisory Com-
mittee's March, 1969 Draft of the federal rule on presump-
tions in civil cases marks out the route in the situation in
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which there is insufficient evidence to support a finding of
the basic fact-I have not covered that situation, since ob-
viously no presumption instruction would be called for at all,
and in any event the March, 1969 Draft was in error in its
prescription for that situation, and the State of Nevada in
its statute perceived the error and corrected it nicely.1"4 The
road map in the March, 1969 Draft also covered the situation
in which the evidence of the nonexistence of the presumed fact
was so cogent and compelling as to require a jury to be told
to find its nonexistence-again I have not covered that sit-
uation, since again it is obvious that no presumption instruc-
tion would be called for at all.1
114. See the Draft of March, 1969, Federal Rule 3-03(c) (1), 46 F.R.D. 161, 212-
213 (1969), which provides in part: "When no evidence is introduced con-
trary to the existence of the presumed fact, the question of its existence
depends upon the existence of the basic facts and is determined as follows:
... (B) If reasonable minds would necessarily agree that the evidence does
not render the existence of the basic facts more probable than not, the judge
shall direct the jury to find against the existence of the presumed fact .... s
The same provisions appear in NEV. REV. STAT. § 47.190(2) (1973). How-
ever, these provisions convey only a half-truth: The trial judge should
instruct the jury to find against the existence of the presumed fact in
such circumstances only if there is insufficient evidence in the case to
support a finding of the existence of the presumed fact, and the presumed
fact may well be proved, or supported by evidence sufficient to find its
existence, even if the basic facts are not proved.
Consider the mailed letter presumption. If the party seeking to prove
delivery of a letter introduces evidence of proper posting which the trial
judge deems to be insufficient to support a jury finding of proper posting,
that party could still conceivably prove delivery in due course. If he could
produce a witness who saw the addressee having the letter in his posses-
sion and reading it, there may well be sufficient evidence to sustain a jury
finding of delivery of the letter, even though conceivably there was not
sufficient evidence to support a finding of proper posting.
The discrepancy in Proposed Rule 3-03 is corrected by NEv. REv. STAT.
§ 47.210 (1973): "When reasonable minds would necessarily agree that the
evidence does not render the existence of the basic facts more probable than
not, but direct evidence is introduced concerning the existence of the pre-
sumed fact, the judge shall submit the matter to the jury with an instruc-
tion to determine the existence of the presumed fact from the direct evi-
dence without reference to the presumption."
115. See the Draft of March, 1969, Federal Rule 3-03(c) (2), 46 F.R.D. 161, 212-
214 (1969), which provides in part: "When reasonable minds would neces-
sarily agree that the evidence renders the existence of the basic facts more
probable than not, the question of the existence of the presumed fact is
determined as follows: (A) If reasonable minds would necessarily agree
that the evidence renders the nonexistence of the presumed fact more prob-
able than not, the judge shall direct the jury to find against the existence
of the presumed fact.... ." See also NEv. REV. STAT. §§ 47.190(1), 47.220(1)
(1973) (authorizing a direction to find the existence of the presumed fact
if reasonable minds would necessarily agree that the evidence so indicates,
where the evidence on the basic facts could be resolved either in favor of or
against their existence) and 47.220(2) (authorizing a direction to find the
nonexistence of the presumed fact if reasonable minds would necessarily
agree that the evidence so indicates, where the evidence on the basic facts
could be resolved either in favor of or against their existence).
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CONCLUSION
McCormick long ago observed that" 'presumption' is the
slipperiest member of the family of legal terms, except its
first cousin, 'burden of proof.' 116 McCormick's motion has
been seconded, considered and carried: Men of extraordinary
ability routinely apologize for writing about presumptions,
and despair of bringing anything like a rational order out of
a perceived chaos.
Slippery or not, the problem of presumptions calls for
a solution, not only in Wyoming, but in the other states pre-
sently considering whether to adopt the Federal Rules (or
the Uniform Rules, or a blend of the two). Six states have
decided to take the reformist approach in adopting the new
Rules; the National Conference of Commissioners on Uni-
form State Laws endorsed this approach; so did the Advisory
Committee on the Federal Rules of Evidence, with Supreme
Court approval. Congress decided otherwise, and the tradi-
tionalist approach is entrenched in federal courts, although
the Federal Rules will not apply in diversity cases with re-
spect to state-created presumptions which bear upon any
"element of a claim or defense" governed by state law.
By themselves, most of the cases are not much help in
deciding between the traditionalist and reformist approaches.
In the first place, usually the decisions are extraordinarily
hard to decipher: Where the proponent of the presumed fact
did not get his case to the jury, did the presumption have
little effect? (Not necessarily; even the reformist approach
does not preclude a directed verdict.) Where the proponent
did get his case to the jury, did the presumption play a great-
er role? (Not necessarily; even the pristine version of the
traditionalist philosophy would allow the jury to draw logical
inferences from the basic facts after the presumption has
disappeared.) In the second place, few decisions achieve any
kind of perspective upon the problem of presumptions; there
are any number of ways by which the language of presump-
tions can rationalize a decision to send or not to send a ques-
116. McCoRMIcH, EVWENC E § 342 (2d ed. 1972).
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tion to the jury, and the larger picture seldom emerges in the
decided case.
But the cases are nevertheless revealing: They tend to
reinforce the notion that in today's world presumptions are
very much ad hoc creations, behaving in a bewildering variety
of ways, and unpredictably as well. The cases, in short, add
fuel to the drive to simplify.
Given a decision to follow but one rule for presumptions,
Uniform Rule 301 is sounder than Federal Rule 301. The
reasons in substantive and procedural policy which call pre-
sumptions into being do not disappear with the introduction
of counterproof; if those reasons are sound enough to control
decision in the absence of proof, they are sound enough to
tip the balance in favor of the presumed fact where an
abundance of proof leaves the issue in doubt.
Broadly construed, Federal Rule 301 is only slightly in-
ferior to Uniform Rule 301. So construed, the former calls
for an instruction that the jury should find the existence of
the presumed fact unless the counterproof makes its non-
existence at least equally likely, while the latter calls for an
instruction that the jury should find the existence of the pre-
sumed fact unless the counterproof makes the nonexistence
of the presumed fact more likely. Narrowly construed, how-
ever, Federal Rule 301 is vastly inferior to Uniform Rule
301; so construed, the Rule would actually turn back the
clock and substantially alter common practice. Regardless
of how Federal Rule 301 is construed, Uniform Rule 301 is
preferable to Federal Rule 301 in that it better serves the
underlying policies of presumptions and generates jury in-
structions which speak the simple and familiar language of
burden of persuasion.
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